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In June 1998 the International Labour Conference adopted a Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up that obligates member States to respect, 
promote and realize freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, the 
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour, the effective abolition of child 
labour, and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.1 
The InFocus Programme on Promoting the Declaration is responsible for the reporting 
processes and technical cooperation activities associated with the Declaration; and it 
carries out awareness raising, advocacy and knowledge functions - of which this Working 
Paper is an example. Working Papers are meant to stimulate discussion of the questions 
covered by the Declaration.  They express the views of the author, which are not 
necessarily those of the ILO. 
 
As part of ILO activities to promote the Declaration, a Special Action Programme to 
combat Forced Labour (SAP-FL) was created by the ILO Governing Body in November 
2001. Since then, SAP-FL has conducted research, awareness raising and technical 
cooperation, working in close collaboration with governments, employers, workers and 
others to eliminate forced labour in all its forms. 
 
This Working Paper on the incidence and patterns of bonded labour in India was 
commissioned as an input to the ILO Director-General’s second global report on forced 
labour, entitled A global alliance against forced labour, prepared for the 93rd session of 
the International Labour Conference in June 2005.   
 
As a particular manifestation of forced labour, bonded labour systems affect very large 
numbers of women and men, girls and boys in South Asia today. Strong legislative 
frameworks are in place in India, Nepal and Pakistan but, in practice, bonded labour 
persists. Yet there have been few recent systematic or large-scale surveys of its incidence 
and characteristics to allow for a reliable assessment of the current extent of the problem.  
 
To help fill this gap, and to facilitate better understanding of bonded labour and its causes 
in South Asia, the ILO has undertaken a range of different initiatives. In Pakistan, a 
research programme undertaken together with the Ministry of Labour has involved rapid 
assessments of bonded labour in different economic sectors and parts of the country. 
These studies have been published as Declaration Working Papers2 as well as in a 
compilation issued by the Government of Pakistan. In Nepal, various studies and surveys 
have been conducted of a particular form of bonded labour, known as the “Kamaiya” 
system, in Western regions. A separate study has addressed other forms of bonded labour 
elsewhere in Nepal. 
 
In India, with its great diversity of labour arrangements, it can never be easy to present an 
overall picture of bonded labour incidence and characteristics. India was the first country 
in the South Asian region to enact legislation against bonded labour, in 1976. Many 
important measures have been taken since then to seek the eradication of forced and 
bonded labour, including Supreme Court judgments of the early 1980s. There have 
historically been a large number of studies of bonded labour in the country, focusing 
                                                 
1The text of the Declaration is available at: http://www.ilo.org/declaration 
2 See Declaration Working Papers Nos. 20-26 
vi 
particularly on the agricultural sector.3  But in more recent years, few academics or others 
have investigated the issue in a systematic way, and official statistics may indeed not 
cover all aspects of the situation. ILO supervisory bodies have for example referred on 
many occasions to the urgent need to compile accurate statistics of the number of persons 
who continue to suffer under bonded labour, using a valid statistical methodology, with a 
view to identification and release of bonded labourers. The Government of India has in 
the meantime pointed to progress made in the field of identification and rehabilitation, 
including central assistance provided to state governments for conducting surveys of 
bonded labour in 120 districts. 
 
This present Working Paper does not aim to replicate all official information, or indeed to 
assess it. Instead, complementing other SAP-FL working papers on this complex matter, 
it aims to enrich the debate on bonded labour and its eradication in India by capturing 
some of the main trends over recent years. It aims essentially to compile and assess the 
contemporary evidence on bonded labour that has appeared in secondary sources. 
 
Following consultation with the Ministry of Labour of the Government of India, this task 
was entrusted to Ravi S. Srivastava, Professor of Economics at Jawaharlal Nehru 
University in New Delhi, who has extensive experience in issues of rural labour markets, 
and particularly in migrant labour.  Assisted by Mr. Anil Kumar Singh, Professor 
Srivastava undertook an extensive search of the recent literature on bonded labour, 
compiling evidence from academic sources, the Government of India, the National 
Human Rights Commission, other human rights organisations, non-governmental 
organisations and press reports. Extensive use was made of the internet. Telephone and 
personal interviews were held also with a number of key informants.  While efforts were 
made to be as comprehensive as possible in this search, focusing in particular on the 
period since 2000, it should be noted that the work was conducted over a relatively short 
period in mid-2004, and that the researchers were not able to travel to individual states. It 
therefore stands to reason that not all sources of information are necessarily covered. 
Nonetheless, the author and we believe that the evidence collected and reviewed in this 
paper represents a reasonable sample of the current evidence, and considerable effort has 
been made to draw upon only those sources which appear to be authentic.4 
 
The picture that emerges from the review provides compelling evidence of the 
persistence of bonded labour in a wide range of economic sectors and in many different 
States. Although it appears that the more traditional forms of agrarian labour attachment 
in India have declined substantially, it seems also that new forms of bondage have 
emerged in more modern agricultural as well as in many different sectors of the informal 
economy.  Migrant labourers appear particularly vulnerable to bonded labour exploitation 
today,, through recruitment systems where labour contractors and intermediaries lure ill-
informed workers from their home communities with advance payments and false 
promises of well-paid, decent work.  SAP-FL research shows that such deceptive 
arrangements are increasingly a feature of forced labour in all parts of the world, whether 
affecting internal or international migrants. 
 
                                                 
3 See Declaration Working Paper No. 11 by L. Mishra for an annotated bibliography on bonded labour in 
India 
4 This has been largely through the personal judgement of the researchers, as it was not possible to seek to 
independently verify each and every report. 
vii 
While not the main focus of the study, the paper also addresses some of the proactive 
measures that have been taken by the Government of India, its civil society partners and 
the ILO to address the prevention and rehabilitation of bonded labour.  As elsewhere in 
the region, the ILO and its SAP-FL programme are keen to cooperate with the Ministry 
of Labour and other partners, providing any technical assistance that might enhance their 
efforts against bonded labour. We sincerely hope that the present Working Paper will be 
seen as one such step in this direction, and help identify areas where practical activities of 
technical cooperation can be further developed. 
 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Srivastava for undertaking this 
challenging assignment so ably, and for respecting the tight deadlines we were obliged to 
impose.  I would like also to thank my colleague in SAP-FL, Caroline O’Reilly, who is 
responsible for our work on bonded labour in South Asia and who oversaw this research 
and edited the paper. Finally, my gratitude is extended to our colleagues in the ILO 
Subregional Office for South Asia in New Delhi, who provided excellent assistance and 
collaboration throughout the process of commissioning and completing this paper. 
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The main objective is this paper is to delineate the current nature and pattern of the 
incidence of bonded labour in India. Article 23 of the Constitution of India of 1949 
bans trafficking in human beings and forced labour. However, the legislation defining 
and banning bonded labour was approved by Parliament only in 1976.  
 
The first large survey to assess the nature and magnitude of bonded labour was 
undertaken in 1978. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of India has pronounced a 
number of judgements to clarify the meaning of the term ‘bonded labour’. It has also 
appointed Commissioners to the Court and has given a number of directives to 
Central and State governments to indicate the incidence of bonded and forced labour 
and to vigorously implement the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976. Since 
1997, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has been given a pivotal role 
in monitoring the implementation of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act and 
in ensuring that the directives of the Supreme Court are followed by the Central and 
State governments.  
 
This paper draws on the contemporary evidence on bonded labour, using reports and 
surveys since the mid-90s, in order to identify changes that may have occurred in the 
incidence and pattern of bonded labour. The National Commission on Rural Labour 
(NCRL) Report of 1991 (Ministry of Labour 1991a and 1991b) will be an important 
benchmark in this study, both in interpreting the contemporary situation and situating 
changes that have occurred in the last few years.  
 
 
2.  Conceptual and Definitional Issues Relating to Bonded 
Labour 
 
The UN Conventions and the ILO Conventions on Forced Labour define and prohibit 
various types of forced labour, slavery and servitude, and debt bondage.  
 
The League of Nations adopted the Slavery Convention in 1926, which was followed 
by the first ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), ratified by India in 1951. 
Article 2(1) of the Convention defines forced labour as “all work or service which is 
exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said 
person has not offered himself voluntarily”.  Following this, the United Nations’ 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 reaffirmed the principle that 
“no one shall be held in slavery or servitude” (Article 4) and the right to “free choice 
of employment” (Article 23(1)). Though Convention 29 on Forced Labour did not 
specifically refer to debt bondage, over time the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations has stated repeatedly that ‘debt 
bondage’ is one form of ‘forced labour’ and is covered by the Convention’s 
definition.  The ILO’s Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No.182) 




Debt bondage is a specific form of forced labour, in which the element of compulsion 
is derived from debt. The UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, 
the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (1956) defines debt 
bondage as “the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal 
services or those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of 
those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt 
or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited or defined” 
(Article 1(a)). 
 
Forced labour, slave labour and servitude are characterised by compulsion, whether 
customary or otherwise.  Bonded labour is characterised by a creditor-debtor 
relationship between the employer and the employee which can then spill over to 
other members of the family, be of an indefinite duration, and involve adverse 
contractual stipulations not justified by law or even by the prevailing state of the 
market. Bonded labour relationships are also usually reinforced by custom or force. 
Thus bonded labour relationships are not purely economic contracts, even though 
employees may enter into them voluntarily because of economic necessity. Once 
employees enter into these relationships, they are characterised by multiple 
asymmetries and high exit costs, which were not a part of the contract, as understood 
by the employee, at the outset. 
 
We would argue that bonded labour refers to a long-term relationship between 
employee and employer which is cemented through a loan, by custom or by force, 
which denies the employee various freedoms including to choose his or her employer, 
to enter into a fresh contract with the same employer or to negotiate the terms and 
condition of her/his contract. We also show below that this concurs with the view 
taken in the Indian Constitution. 
 
The problem of unfree labour in society is age old (cf. Kumar, 1965). The status of 
various categories of labour in India has been historically circumscribed by the social 
structure which has also determined the access of various groups to land and other 
productive assets. The specific characteristics of bondage in contemporary India relate 
to the transition in the economy and society and have to be largely understood in 
terms of the nature of the articulation between poor and developed regions and 
between traditional and modern sectors. 
 
Forced labour violates the fundamental rights guaranteed to all citizens by the Indian 
Constitution. Article 23(1) in Part III of the Indian Constitution, relating to 
Fundamental Rights, states that “Traffic in human beings and begar5 and other forms 
of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of the provision shall be an 
offence, punishable by law.”  
 
The law dealing with bonded and forced labour was legislated by the Indian 
Parliament in 1976. The Bonded Labour System Abolition Act (1976) of India is quite 
extraordinary in that it recognises (a) the overlap between forced labour and bonded 
labour in customary relationships, and also (b) the manifestation of these relationships 
in contract labour and inter-state migration, and (c) considers the nature of restraints 
                                                 
5  Customary and obligatory labour services which are performed without remuneration by labourers, 
tenants or low caste employees for upper caste landlords and/or employers. 
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suffered by the labourer as a result of the bonded/forced labour relationship, and 
makes all of these illegal. 
 
Section 2 of the Act sets out the definition of bonded labour; extracts of the Section 
are reproduced in full at Annex 1 to this paper. The Act defines ‘bonded labour’ as a 
service rendered under the ‘bonded labour system’. This is a system of forced, or 
partly forced, labour under which the debtor enters into an agreement, oral or written, 
with the creditor. According to this agreement, in consideration of an ‘advance’ 
obtained by the debtor or by any of his lineal ascendants and in consideration of 
interest on such an advance or in pursuance of any customary obligation or by reason 
of his birth in any particular caste or community, the debtor agrees to render, by 
himself or through any member of his family, labour for the creditor for a specified or 
unspecified period of time either without wages or for nominal wages6, or forfeit the 
freedom of employment or other means of livelihood, or forfeit the right to move 
freely throughout India, or forfeit the right to appropriate or sell at market value any 
of his property or the product of his own or any of his family members’ labour. 
 
The 1976 Act also lays down the monitoring, enforcement and implementation 
modalities, which rest mainly with the State governments. 
 
The ambit of ‘bonded labour’ prohibited by the 1976 Act has been clarified by the 
Supreme Court in a number of judgements, including the Asiad Workers’ Case (1982) 
and the Bandhua Mukti Morcha Case (1984). The Courts have clarified that the 1976 
Act is derived from Article 23(1) of the Constitution whose ambit is much wider than 
Article 4 of the UDHR, since “the Article strikes at forced labour in whatever form it 
may manifest itself, because it is violative of human dignity and is contrary to basic 
human values” (Supreme Court judgement in the Asiad case). 
 
The Supreme Court of India has taken a wide view of what may constitute ‘force’ in a 
labour relationship, stating (also in the Asiad case) that: 
 
“Any factor which deprives a person of a choice of alternatives and compels him to 
adopt a particular course of action, may properly be regarded as ‘force’ and if labour 
and service is compelled as a result of such ‘force’ it would be ‘forced labour’. The 
word ‘force’ must be construed to include not only physical or legal force but also 
force arising from compulsion of economic circumstances which leaves no choice of 
economic circumstance to a person in want and compels him to provide labour or 
service even though the remuneration received for it is less than the minimum wage. 
Therefore, when a person provides labour or service to another for remuneration, 
which is less than the minimum wage, the labour or service provided by him clearly 
falls within the scope and ambit of the words ‘forced labour’.”  
 
This is again reiterated by the Supreme Court in its judgement of 18 September 1992 
(Writ Petition 8143 of 1981, People’s Union for Democratic Rights vs. Union of 
India) where it clarified that “… when a person provides labour or service to another 
against receipt of remuneration which is less than the minimum wage, he is acting 
                                                 
6 "Nominal wages" means a wage which is less than  (a) the minimum wages fixed by the Government, 
in relation to the same or similar labour; and (b) where no such minimum wage has been fixed, the 
wages that are normally paid, for the same or similar labour, to the labourers working in the same 
locality 
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under some force of some compulsion which drives him to work though he is paid 
less than what he is entitled under law to receive.”  
 
Thus, one of the important outcomes of the bonded labour relationship, according to 
the Act and subsequent Supreme Court judgements, is the payment of the labourer at 
wages which are below the prevailing market wage or the legally stipulated minimum 
wage. Although this is a controversial stipulation in the case of certain sectors where 
market wages are normally below the legal minimum (as in agriculture in several 
regions), in sectors where there are long duration labour contracts, the payment of 
wages below the legal minimum is both a cause and effect of a significant incidence 
of credit bondage.7 
 
The main thing to note here is that (a) the mere presence of a creditor-debtor 
relationship between a labourer and an employer is not sufficient to denote a bonded 
labour relationship: the latter should result also in other involuntary restraints on the 
labourer; and (b) in the Indian context, a creditor-debtor relationship is not even a 
necessary condition of bondage, since the Indian legal definition of bondage 
incorporates various categories of forced labour, while still treating the creditor-
debtor relationship as an important part of bondage.8 
 
 
3.  Incidence and Nature of Bonded Labour in India 
 
Bonded labour was outlawed in India through an ordinance in 1975 and then through 
legislation in 1976. The first systematic survey of bonded labour was carried out by 
the Gandhi Peace Foundation and the National Labour Institute during May to 
December 1978 and placed the total number of bonded labourers at 2.62 million 
(Sarma, 1981). The estimate was based on a survey of 1000 villages in 10 states. In 
the survey, 61.5% of the bonded labourers were members of Scheduled Castes (SC) 
and 25.1% were members of Scheduled Tribes (ST). Among the employers, 89% 
were agriculturalists. The survey categorised bondage into inter-generational 
bondage; child bondage; loyalty bondage; bondage through land allotment; and 
widow bondage. The 32nd Round of the National Sample Survey Organisation gave an 
estimate of 343,000 bonded labourers in 16 major states.  
 
The National Commission on Rural Labour (NCRL), 1991,9 basing itself on the Study 
Group on Bonded Labour, chaired by B. N. Yugandhar,10 presented the first 
comprehensive picture of the nature and incidence of bonded labour, its causes, and 
                                                 
7 Taken by itself, the issue of identification of bonded labour with non-payment of minimum wages has 
caused some unnecessary ambiguity in interpretation. For example, the Report of the Central 
Committee to draw up a workable definition of Bonded Labour, Ministry of Labour, Government of 
India (1994) concluded that all cases of payment of wages below minimum wage could not 
straightforwardly be brought under the Act. This, in our view, was not the intention of the Act, nor of 
the Supreme Court. The issue of minimum wages is simply one yardstick (and by no means a necessary 
or sufficient yardstick) to test whether wages are being unduly depressed in a labour relationship. 
8  The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) Expert Group (2001) has concluded that the 
intention of Article 23 of the Constitution is the prohibition of all kinds of forced labour and not only 
forced labour based on debt. The Group has made detailed recommendations with regard to provisions 
of the Act and for rehabilitation. 
9   Ministry of Labour, 1991a 
10  Ministry of Labour, 1991b 
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strategies for its abolition. It also made recommendations for amendments to the 1976 
legislation.  
 
The NCRL saw bondage of agricultural labourers as still being the main form of 
bondage in India. The Commission concluded that agricultural labour bondage was 
higher in States and districts characterised by a high percentage of rural labourers, low 
irrigation and agricultural productivity and poor infrastructure. However, there were 
bonded labourers also in the plantation sector: for example, bonded labourers from 
Orissa and Bihar were employed in the plantation sector in Assam and Tripura. 
 
The NCRL mentioned the following non-agricultural sectors as having a high 
incidence of bonded labour (although it is conceded that they have not been 
adequately surveyed): stone quarries; migrant labour; brick kilns; system of joginis 
and devdasis; fishermen; forest labour; bidi workers; carpet weavers; pottery; 
weavers; head loaders; child labour in match and fireworks; carpet weaving etc. 
 
The NCRL found a high incidence of migrant bonded labour: Bihari labour in the 
fields of Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh; in brick kilns of these states; in 
sugarcane fields in Gujarat; in stone and slate quarries and mines; in plantations of 
Assam; and even in the seaports of Gujarat. The Commission highlighted bondage 
among women on account of social as well as economic factors and mentioned the 
joginis of Andhra Pradesh and the devdasis of Karnataka.11 In the Jaunsar-Babbar 
area, the Commission’s report highlighted the indebtedness-induced prostitution of 
women and children. The Commission mentioned a high incidence of child labour 
and child bondage in a number of sectors. The Commission also highlighted the well-
entrenched system of tribal exploitation, expropriation and bondage in many parts of 
the country including the Santhal Parganas. In examining the regional spread of 
bonded labour, it found the practice widespread in all parts of the country. 
 
The Commission noted the interesting and significant phenomenon of the same region 
both supplying and importing bonded migrant labour. Labourers from Andhra 
Pradesh outmigrate for work in quarries and kilns in Haryana, Punjab and Madhya 
Pradesh whereas labourers from other states are in bondage in the quarries of Andhra. 
Similarly, a two-way traffic of migrant bonded labour existed from Chhatisgarh and 
out of Singhbhum and in the sugarcane farms of Maharashtra and Gujarat. 
 
The Supreme Court appointed on March 6, 1995, a two member commission 
comprising Mr. Siraj Saith and Mr. Felix Sugirtharaj to verify the contents of the 
affidavit of the Government of Tamil Nadu in Writ Petition No. 3922 of 1985 that 
there were only stray cases of bonded labour in the State of Tamil Nadu. The 
Commission submitted its report to the Court on October 31, 1995 (Sugirtharaj and 
Sait, 1995, hereafter referred to as the Tamil Nadu Commissioners’ Report 1995). In 
an exhaustive report, based on a large survey, the Commissioners concluded that there 
were over one million bonded labourers in Tamil Nadu, spread over 23 districts and 
20 occupations, of which 10 percent were bonded child labourers (with a higher rate 
among girls). Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST) and Most Backward Caste 
                                                 
11 Under these systems, young women are “wedded” to God, declared to be ‘saints’ and become the 
property of the local temple and under the control of the men who run it. They suffer from sexual 
exploitation and deprivations such as prohibition on undertaking other work, leaving the village and 
marrying again. 
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(MBC) bonded labourers formed 76% of the total. The concentration of the low castes 
was higher in the quarry industry. In almost all cases, the element of bondage was 
found to be debt. 
 
In the course of a hearing on a Writ Petition filed by the People’s Union for Civil 
Liberties (PUCL) in April 1985 on the engagement of bonded labour in Tamil Nadu 
and Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court issued a direction in May 1994 to all the 
State Governments, inter alia, to collect information on the prevalence of bonded 
labour, to identify bonded labourers and to rehabilitate them. The State governments 
subsequently carried out surveys to ascertain the ground situation with regard to 
bonded labour. However, in most cases, the figures obtained and presented by the 
State governments subsequently turned out to be significantly underestimated. 
 
Table 1 presents the number of bonded labourers identified in the 1996 surveys, and 
those subsequently identified and rehabilitated till March 31, 2004. 
 
Table 1: Bonded Labourers identified in the 1996 surveys, and those 
subsequently identified and rehabilitated till March 31, 2004. 
 




March 31, 2004 
Rehabilitated 
1 Andhra Pradesh 0 37,988 31,534 
2 Bihar 106 13,370 12,552 
3 Karnataka 19 63,373 57,121 
4 Madhya Pradesh 18 12,822 11,897 
5 Orissa 0 50,010 46,882 
6 Rajasthan 0 7,488 6,331 
7 Tamil Nadu 25,008 65,573 65,573 
8 Maharashtra 2 1,398 1,319 
9 Uttar Pradesh 237 28,195 28,195 
10 Kerala 0 823 710 
11 Haryana 0 551 49 
12 Gujarat 0 64 64 
13 Arunachal Pradesh 3626 3526 2992 
14 Chhatisgarh 0 124 124 
15 Punjab 0 69 69 
16 Uttaranchal 0 5 5 
17 Total 29,016 285,379 265,417 
 
Source: Director General, Labour Welfare, Ministry of Labour, Government of India 
  
The regional picture that emerges is a high concentration of bonded labourers in the 
three Southern States of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka and in Uttar 
Pradesh. However, as we show throughout this paper, although there is widespread 
evidence of bonded labour throughout the country, our information depends upon 
scattered evidence and we do not have a clear and systematic basis for inferring 
regional or sectoral trends. 
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The NHRC constituted an Expert Group in 2000, chaired by Mr. S. R. Sankaran, for 
identification of bonded labour prone districts, industries and occupations and for 
various aspects relating to legislation and implementation. The Expert Group, in its 
Report submitted to the NHRC in 2001, concluded that although the Ministry of 
Labour had identified 13 states and 172 districts as being bonded labour prone, the 
system is prevalent in almost all states (NHRC, 2001). 
 
The Expert Group also concluded that bonded labour in agriculture has a high 
incidence in the States of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab and Tamil Nadu. In the non-agricultural sector, 
it concluded that bonded labour is rampant in brick kilns, stone quarries, beedi 
manufacturing, carpet weaving and construction, and child bonded labour in the silk 
industry. It further concluded that migrant bonded labour involving states such as 
Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhatisgarh, Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, 
Punjab and Haryana represented an aggravated form of deprivation and exploitation 
(ibid.). 
 
The Group felt that, owing to the efforts made by the NHRC through its Special 
Rapporteur system, the process of identification, release and rehabilitation of bonded 
labourers had received a fillip. For example, till 2001, 1,069 cases of bonded labour 
had been identified in Karnataka and another 1,212 were being investigated. In Tamil 
Nadu, since the survey of 1996-97, 10,850 cases had been identified. In Andhra 
Pradesh, 3,122 cases of bonded labour had been identified, mostly in 2001. 
 
Although systematic, non-official surveys of bonded labour are difficult to come by, 
there are several surveys in different parts of the country and different industries 
which give an idea of the continued nature of the problem. Moreover, non-
governmental organizations which have taken up issues relating to bonded labourers 
and been leading the process of identification and release, have compiled extensive 
documentation. We refer to these surveys and statistics in our analysis below, 
although their findings are often not accepted by State governments or other official 
investigating agencies.  
 
For example, in Punjab, where the State government has till quite recently denied the 
existence of bonded labour, the NHRC has assiduously been pursuing complaints 
regarding bonded labour in agriculture, brick kilns and other sectors, and has upheld 
these complaints in a few cases. The Volunteers for Social Justice (VSJ), a non-
governmental organisation based in Punjab, has filed over 2,000 cases on behalf of 
both local and migrant bonded labourers released from agriculture, brick kilns and 
other sectors mainly in Punjab (Singh, 2003). A majority of the cases referred to 
bonded labourers belonging to the Scheduled Castes (59 % of the complaints made to 
the NHRC pertained to Scheduled Castes). Between 1998 and 2004, the VSJ was able 
to secure the release of 1,832 bonded labourers through the intervention of the NHRC, 
the Punjab State Human Rights Commission (PSHRC), Punjab and Haryana High 
Courts, the District Administration and the SC/ST Commissioner, but rehabilitation 
had taken place in only four cases (Singh, 2004). This is suggestive of the chasm 
between civil society organisations and government on the issue of bonded labour, 




3.1 Typology of Bonded Labour 
 
As we have noted above, there are few recent systematic surveys of bonded labour. 
However, an analysis of the existing evidence suggests that the non-agricultural sector 
now has a very significant number of bonded labourers. Broadly, our analysis of the 
literature and recent evidence suggests that the following types of bonded labour 
continue to be significant. 
(a) Bonded labour that is a vestige of traditional social relations 
 
Traditional social relations have sanctioned a caste-based division of labour in which 
servile castes are expected to perform low status functions in exchange for a 
guarantee of subsistence. Degrees of social exclusion ensure a low degree of social 
mobility and social cohesion despite a strong policy of positive discrimination 
pursued by the government. Moreover, personalised servile relationships based on the 
traditional social structure persist in some parts of the country, mostly in backward 
agriculture, but are also sometimes carried over into the non-agrarian sector, through, 
for example, domestic service. These relationships have declined over the years. Their 
persistence today is probably less a matter of social custom and more due to other 
elements of force and compulsion, as brought out in recent enquiries into the Sullong 
tribe in the North-East.  
 
Labour bondage draws heavily upon traditional social relations and the caste system, 
even in the non-agricultural sector, but can be seen most directly in agriculture and in 
bonded labour relationships involving tribals.  
 
(b) Bonded labour in agriculture 
 
The uneven pace of modernisation of agriculture has created new demands for a 
stable and servile labour force, which, in some cases, is obtained through credit 
bondage and elements of force, deceit and compulsion. Migrant labour situations 
seem to create a higher propensity for bondage. In the areas of origin, from where 
males are on the move, women or children may find themselves in bondage. In 
destination areas, migrant labour may end up in bondage. Bonded labour relations 
have also been alleged in commercial plantations. The paper examines the evidence 
regarding bonded labour in transitional agriculture. 
 
(c) Bonded labour in the rural and urban unorganised and informal sector 
 
The incidence of bonded labour is perhaps the highest in the unorganised and 
informal sector in India. And among the unorganised sectors, the incidence of 
bondage is probably the highest in quarries and open mines. These industries are 
mainly characterised by the predominance of manual processes, seasonality, 
remoteness and contract migrant labour. Brick kilns are another industry which 
reportedly continues to have a sizeable incidence of bonded labour. Among industries 
for which recent evidence has accumulated are power looms, handlooms, rice mills, 
sericulture and silk weaving, woollen carpets, fish processing, and construction. 
Bonded labour, including of children, has been identified in a number of other sectors 
including the circus industry and domestic work. 
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(d) Child bonded labour: Several industries with a high incidence of child labour 
(woollen carpets, silk, gem cutting and polishing) still show an incidence of child 
bondage, which we will examine in this paper. 
 
 
4. Causes of Bonded Labour 
 
There are few systematic analyses of the causes and correlates of bonded labour in 
India. Studies of labour relations in the past have highlighted the link between caste 
and social structure and bondage, on the one hand, and traditional feudal social 
relations and bonded labour, on the other.12 Colonialism heightened the dimension of 
debt bondage, both within and outside agriculture.13  
 
It is apparent from the evidence presented later in this paper that bondage and forced 
labour in India, whether traditional or modern, thrive on a bedrock of social hierarchy 
and discrimination, of which the former untouchable castes and the tribal groups, and 
women and children are the chief victims. It can be hypothesised that the low 
visibility of the issue of bondage is due precisely to the fact that its many victims have 
a low social ascription and fewer perceived rights. 
 
Thorner and Thorner (1962) had drawn attention to three types of ‘unfree’ labour 
relations – the long-duration relations, the ‘beck and call’ relationship, and the system 
of ‘forced’ free or underpaid labour of tenants – each of these forms being 
underpinned by a relationship of dominance and dependence. In focusing on forms of 
forced labour in post-colonial agriculture in India, it may be useful to understand the 
extent to which these arose out of traditional or customary relationships, or were born 
out of forms of debt-bondage which emerged during the colonial period (reinforced 
by vestiges of ‘custom’), or alternatively have their genesis in the requirements of 
capitalist agriculture. Many forms of labour attachment described by Thorner and 
Thorner (1962) and discussed in the First and Second Agriculture Labour Enquiry 
Committee Reports, bear predominantly traditional features which subsume loan and 
land-lease relationships. On the other hand, the relatively well-studied debt-bondage 
relationships in Palamau appear to belong mainly to the second category (Mundle, 
1979). We have argued that the customary elements in such relationships have been 
under pressure in different regions of the country for a number of reasons, and that 
traditional forms of long-duration relationships have shown a tendency to decline over 
time.14  
                                                 
12  For a study of evolution of labour relations in India, see Kumar (1965) and Patnaik (1983). 
13   A number of studies have documented the growth of debt bondage in different sectors in India 
during the colonial period e.g. see Sarkar (1985). A full review of these is outside the cope of this 
paper, but both the subsequent break and continuity and novelty in the causes and the institutions which 
account for the persistence of debt bondage need to be fully appreciated. 
14  Breman's (1974) study of the Dublas in Gujarat shows how the decline in traditional hereditary 
dependence took place, and how in certain areas, it came to be replaced by a different form of 
"attachment". Srivastava’s (1989) study shows the virtual disappearance of the traditional Hali system 
from his area of study in Western Uttar Pradesh and a considerable decline in the importance of 
traditional halwaha and jeura relationships in the Eastern UP study villages. Wilson (1999) reports a 
decline in traditional labour attachment in Nalanda in Bihar since the early 1960s. In 1981-83, 41 
percent of labour households had an attached labourer but this proportion had declined to 26% in 1995-
96. Jha (1997) also finds evidence of attached labour in 21 percent labour households in Purnea district 
of Bihar but also reports variations in the terms and conditions of their contract. Corta and 
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Attached labour relationships reflecting credit-labour linkages have also existed in 
agriculturally developed areas.15  Indeed, it has been argued that attached labour may 
tend to rise with capitalist development in agriculture in order to meet the need of 
employers to secure peak-season labour and other all-year-round labour requirements 
(Bardhan and Rudra, 1981; Bhalla, 1976; Bardhan, 1984). There is a debate as to 
whether attached labour is necessarily bonded in the sense that it is characterised by 
‘unfreedom’ and low remuneration. We have argued elsewhere (Srivastava, 1989, 
1997, 2000) that this is not necessarily always the case. But at the same time, 
elements of bondage are often present in such labour relationships and careful 
analysis is therefore needed to categorise them. For example, the National 
Commission on Rural Labour (1991) found that in lieu of an initial loan, the ‘naukar’ 
in Haryana was compelled to accept a contract with several unacceptable features 
(including low wages) and which imposes severe constraints on his freedom. Jodhka 
(1994) described the system as one of labour mortgage.  
 
The articulation of poor agrarian regions with regions of capitalist development 
through labour migration often also enables agrarian capitalists to impose poor 
working conditions and degrees of unfreedom on migrant labourers, even though local 
farm servants may enjoy superior working conditions. There has been considerable 
discussion of these issues in the context of Punjab’s agriculture. Although some of the 
worst forms of exploitation seem to have abated with time, bonded labour relations 
are still reported in Punjab agriculture. In the case of Western Uttar Pradesh, our own 
studies have established bondage and forced labour among migrant labourers 
(Srivastava, 1999). There is also evidence of the phenomenon from other areas (e.g. 
cotton seed farms in Andhra Pradesh). 
 
The colonial pattern of surplus extraction from agriculture, the abolition of slavery in 
the colonies and an enclave-type development of mines, plantation and industry, had 
earlier provided for both the supply of and demand for cheap labour. Recruitment 
patterns developed in response to information asymmetries and the transaction costs 
involved, on the one hand, and the need to obtain cheap and disciplined labour, on the 
other. Numerous studies have documented how a system of intermediaries was used 
in the colonial period to recruit indentured labour. Since then, labour recruitment 
continues to be of an organised nature in a number of industries and both the pattern 
of recruitment and labour deployment is dominated by contractors (Srivastava, 1998). 
The recruitment pattern creates its own dynamic, segmenting the labour market and 
creating what Breman (1996) has termed as “circuits” of labour. The interesting issue 
is that, as we have pointed out elsewhere, labour migration is not impelled by labour 
scarcity but is prevalent both in areas of labour scarcity and labour abundance. In fact, 
the in-migration of labour in some areas is sometimes matched by out-migration, 
creating what we have called two-way circuits of labour (Srivastava, 1998).  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Venkateshwarlu (1999) find that traditional attachment in their study areas of Chittoor district declined 
from 24 percent of male labourers in 1970 to nil in 1995. Kapadia (1996) and Athreya et al (1990) 
report that hardly any pannaiyal (tied) labourers were left in Trichurapalli district in Tamil Nadu. The 
National Commission on Rural Labour, 1991, reports a similar decline in labour attachment in Palamau 
(Bihar) and Varanasi (Uttar Pradesh). 
15  Thorner and Thorner (1962) cite the findings First Agricultural Labour Enquiry Committee, to show 
that there was a high proportion of long-duration contracts in coastal Andhra Pradesh and Punjab. 
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This suggests that bondage of migrant labour is seen as a way of both disciplining 
labour and of keeping labour costs down. This is another reason why bonded labour 
systems thrive on the labour of migrants, women and children. Migratory labour is 
less able to assert rights and entitlements and is more vulnerable to predatory 
capitalism (Srivastava and Sasikumar, 2003). In a situation of transition of greater 
possibilities for assertion by local labour, migrant labour is also more susceptible to 
exploitation and bondage (ibid.). 
 
Given the uneven pattern of development in post-colonial India, some relatively 
unorganised segments of the modern sector as well as the informal sector have 
continued to source cheap migrant labour supplies through credit bondage. Two-thirds 
of the country’s workforce is still in agriculture and a similar proportion of arable area 
is rain-fed and drought-prone. The percentage of rural workers dependent on wage 
labour has been steadily increasing, along with a rise in the near assetlessness of such 
labourers (Srivastava 2000). The employment and livelihood potential of agriculture 
in such areas is extremely low and is subject to large seasonal fluctuations. The 
landholding structure is dominated by upper or middle castes who also dominate the 
emergent non-agrarian economy. Loans have to be taken by the poor labourers to tide 
over seasonal shortages or contingent expenditure. Contractors or employers step in 
with advances either to meet repayment requirements in the areas of origin or to 
provide the labourers with assistance to tide over the financial emergency. The 
migrant labourers then become involved in a vicious cycle of debt from which they 
cannot escape and which provides a handle to contractors and employers to impose 
numerous adverse conditions. 16 
 
In the tribal areas, the alienation of tribals from land and non-tribal control over land 
created the conditions for debt bondage in agriculture. Further, the uprooting of tribals 
from their traditional habitat, receding forest cover, low agricultural productivity and 
rain-fed agriculture, create the need for credit and for seeking employment and 
livelihoods under bondage, often through migration.17  
 
Many of the rural sector industries that have a high incidence of bonded labour are 
situated in isolated settings, where intermediaries dominate the employment structure. 
The owners of these industries are either part of the rural power structure or have 
strong links with that structure. Moreover, these industries are technologically 
backward and labour intensive. Lack of technological modernisation is both a cause 
and an effect of the low cost labour processes that dominate these industries. 
 
Public action, broadly conceived as the set of both regulatory and promotional 
developmental action undertaken by the State, has a strong influence on the existence 
of bonded labour. Most States in India have not so far focused sufficient attention on 
the developmental approaches that could eliminate the causes of bondage. Also, the 
regulatory framework tends to be weak. In places where the State has undertaken a set 
                                                 
16  Srivastava (1989) provides a detailed account of the recruitment pattern for labour migrants in 
different sectors. 
17  For a review of labour migration in India and its impacts, see Srivastava (1998) and Srivastava and 
Sasikumar (2003). 
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of promotional and redistributive policies that favour labourers, as in Kerala, the 
incidence of bonded labour is much lower.18 
 
 
5. Incidence of Bonded Labour by Sector 
 
5.1  Bonded Labour in Agriculture 
 
The Bonded Labour System Abolition Act (1976) identified a large number of 
traditional labour systems which reproduce bondage, with or without debt. The 
Gandhi-Peace Foundation – National Labour Institute survey of 1978  (Sarma, 1981) 
identified a large number of bonded agricultural labourers in the States surveyed. A 
study of farm servants in different areas of Uttar Pradesh by Srivastava (1989) 
showed that customary labour relations, which could result in attachment without any 
debt bondage, were undergoing change in some parts, with the hali labour system in 
Western Uttar Pradesh having become more contractual with wages reflecting 
individual and skill differentials. The decline of traditional labour systems which 
resulted in forced labour has been documented and analysed in a number of studies. 
At the same time, new forms of attachment have been arising in developed 
agriculture, leading Srivastava (1989, 1996) to assert that there was a ‘U’ shaped 
relationship between the existence of labour attachment and agricultural development 
i.e. that it initially declines as agriculture develops, but starts to increase again at a 
later stage of development.  
 
The nature of attachment, since the study by Bardhan and Rudra (1978), has been  the 
subject of intense controversy in the theoretical literature. An analysis of recent 
evidence corroborates the conclusion reached by the NCRL, 1991 (Ministry of Labour 
1991a and b) and the NHRC Expert Group that there is still a sizeable incidence of 
bonded labour in agriculture in several parts of the country (NHRC, 2001). These 
bonded labour relationships are embedded in socio-economic dominance of certain 
groups, but they also reflect the changing labour requirements of agricultural 
employers under the impact of capitalist development. Further, they often reflect the 
articulation between developed and backward agriculture. 
 
Punjab’s agriculture has been among the most developed in India. It has earlier been 
argued that the rise in literacy of SCs, their entry into services, higher aspirations and 
wage demands led to a decline in attached labourers from the local SC community 
and their replacement by migrant labourers from Bihar, initially from the tribal 
community in Ranchi. The process of recruitment was managed by contractors who 
had their agents in Ranchi. The recruited tribal labourers were confined locally and 
sold to their employers. Once employed, the labourers were kept in bondage (Singh, 
1997). They were paid a pittance and had to pay interest on advances. Many, 
however, were compelled a second time to return to Hoshiarpur through the 
contractors. The system of bondage is considered (ibid.) to have registered a decline 
by the mid 1990s, due to a steady supply of immigrant labour and the role of 
voluntary organisations. But recent evidence has been accumulating before the 
NHRC, in the form of complaints of bondage among both local and migrant labourers 
                                                 
18  But migrant labour and its condition has a low visibility in Kerala. Not surprisingly, NGOs have 
detected migrant bonded labour in some industries.  
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filed by several organisations such as the Indian Social Institute and the Volunteers 
for Social Justice.19  
 
The nature of bondage among local agricultural labour, mostly drawn from the low 
castes, has been highlighted by the VSJ. According to the submissions made by the 
organisation, the attached labourers in debt bondage in Punjab are known as Siri. 
They generally belong to the scheduled caste community and have no freedom to 
choose employment, to right of movement, to use village commons, etc; and endure 
long working hours. The cattleshed cleaners are usually the wives of the Siris and are 
in indirect bondage. The child assistant in agricultural work is known as Pali. Protests 
from the farm servants, including attempts to release them from bondage, have been 
met with physical violence and social boycotts in a number of cases. The organisation 
estimates that there are about half a million agricultural bonded labourers and several 
hundred thousand people in bondage in brick kilns in Punjab. Of the nearly 2000 
cases filed by the VSJ on behalf of bonded labourers, three-quarters were from the 
Malwa region of Punjab, followed by the Doab region (Singh, 2003, 2004). 
 
Complaints of bondage are still received from Haryana, where attached labour 
relationships based on debt have earlier been reported. A Scheduled Caste bonded 
labourer was rescued from Fatehabad district by the Democratic Youth Federation 
after he was beaten brutally by the landlord and kept in chains (Rajalakshmi, 2001). 
His father had taken a loan from the landlord’s family. Both the labourer and his wife 
worked long hours for the landlord without receiving any regular wage. The 
organisation has also reported a number of cases of bonded labour from other villages 
and districts of Haryana. 
 
In the case of Western Uttar Pradesh, where the decline of traditional attached labour 
relationships had earlier been reported by Srivastava (1989), later studies have 
reported a system of recruitment of attached labour from Bihar and Nepal, with 
workers being kept under bondage, made to work for long hours and denied wages 
(Srivastava, 1999). 
 
Tribals have long been subject to exploitative debt relationships in several parts of the 
country, resulting in bondage. According to some views, these practices have declined 
somewhat but there is still a high incidence of bondage among tribals in agriculture. A 
study of Kol tribals20 in Halia Block of Mirzapur district of Southern Uttar Pradesh 
found that a number of tribals were indebted to the landlord, in some cases for more 
than one generation. The initial loans (taken for marriage or for some other purpose) 
were relatively small, but the tribals were unable to repay them because of their 
meagre wages and because eventual ‘freedom’ required repayment at high compound 
                                                 
19  The problem of bondage among migrant labourers in Punjab has been highlighted in several reports 
and complaints filed by Jai Singh of the VSJ. The NHRC has also taken cognisance of a complaint 
filed by the Indian Social Institute and other reports of sale and trafficking of labourers (and possible 
sexual exploitation of women workers) in Punjab. Its own investigation revealed extensive trafficking 
in labour for the last 30 years in Punjab. It has accordingly directed the Central and State governments 
to formulate schemes which can ameliorate the condition of migrant labourers in the state. Replies 
from the government are now under consideration of the Commission (NHRC Annual Report, 2001-
02). 
 
20 The kols are given the status of Scheduled Castes in Uttar Pradesh, whereas in neighbouring Madhya 
Pradesh, they are categorised as Scheduled Tribes. 
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interest (60 percent annually). The bonded labourers could also be sold to other 
employers and the debt obligation was transferred. These labourers were paid a daily 
wage rate of about 2 kg of coarse grain and were given a tiny plot of land – about one 
seventh of an acre to meet their subsistence requirements (Shankar, 1996). 
 
In the neighbouring district of Sonbhadra, the NHRC investigated a complaint from 
the South Asian Coalition on Child Servitude (SACCS) that eight labourers belonging 
to the kol community had been kept in bondage by an upper caste landlord and for 
two years had not been paid wages, which were ostensibly adjusted against advances. 
One of the labourers, who could not attend work due to illness, was beaten badly by 
the employer. The district administration, in its report to the Commission, said that 
four of the labourers had left the landlord because they were paid meagre wages and 
were beaten by him. The other four were still working with him but were paid a wage 
of only 2 kg of grain per day. The Commission directed that proceedings under the 
Bonded Labour Act and SC/ST Atrocities Act be initiated against the employer, and 
steps be taken to rehabilitate the labourers (NHRC Report 2001-02). 
 
The NHRC took suo moto cognisance of a press report of a low caste bonded labourer 
in Palamau district of Bihar. The person had been working as a bonded labourer for 
20 years for supposed non-payment of a loan of Rs 2,000, although he had in reality 
repaid the loan 15 years previously. The labourer had to work for over 16 hours a day 
and was paid a daily wage rate of Rs 10, although the prevailing wage rate was        
Rs 60.21 Several other cases of bonded labour in agriculture, in some cases 
intergenerational bondage, have been reported from Patna, Nalanda, Bettiah, Gaya 
and other districts of Bihar.22 
 
Case studies collected by the National Labour Institute in Chittorgarh, Rajasthan, 
revealed a number of cases of tribal (Bhil) labourers working for landlords in lieu of 
advances taken by them to cover expenses of marriages, illness etc. In all such cases, 
the labourers were not paid any specified wage, but only given meals and some 
perquisites (Upadhyay, 2000).  
 
The kamia-malik system of debt bondage is reported to be prevalent in the erstwhile 
districts of Raipur and Raigarh in Chhatisgarh State. The kamia, a male farm servant, 
along with his family members, is liable to provide labour in the home and farm of the 
malik (the master) till his debt is cleared. Although under decline now, the system 
continues to exist even today (CEC 2004, p. 29; Sen 1995). 
 
In the state of Madhya Pradesh, cases of bonded agricultural labour came to light in 
Harda (an area where agriculture is rapidly developing due to profitable oilseed 
cultivation) and adjoining districts, when a local NGO took the initiative (on the plea 
of relatives) to get the labourers released. The system again involves the repayment of 
a loan through labour but the wages are so meagre that the labourer remains in 
bondage. Moreover, if freedom is desired, the employers charge a high rate of 
interest. Although some labourers have been released under pressure from the NGO, 
their rehabilitation had not taken place (Noronha, 2003; Menon, 2003). Cases of 
                                                 
21   NHRC Case no. 136/34/2002-03. 
22   CEC 2004, p. 25-26; Aneeta Sharma, Times of India, Nov. 9,1999, Mumbai. 
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labour bondage in agriculture have been reported from Raisen and Ratlam districts in 
the State (CEC 2004, p. 51). 
 
Lahiri and Krishna (2000) have touched upon the system of Bhalua existing in parts 
of Midnapur district in West Bengal. The Bhalua remains in debt bondage because of 
low payments/earnings.  
 
In a survey carried out between 1988-1995 in 48 of the 174 sub-districts of Karnataka 
State, an NGO - JEEVIKA - identified over 18,000 bonded labourers, and submitted 
individual petitions for rehabilitation for more than 16,000. JEEVIKA acknowledges 
that the Government of Karnataka has been more active than any other state in 
identifying and rehabilitating bonded labourers.  Nevertheless, it had identified only 
2,866 bonded labourers in Karnataka between 1979 and 1992.23 A rapid appraisal 
study carried out for the ILO Social Finance Programme in four districts of 
Karnataka, found that bonded labour relationships existed because of caste-based 
dependence or because of the traditional loan-based practices of Jeetam or bitti 
chakri, involving the pledging of labour of an adult and his spouse, or a child against 
a loan taken from the landlord/employer. The repayment conditions were in 
conformity with market rates and minimum wage legislation in a very small number 
of cases (ILO, 2002b). 
 
The Tamil Nadu Commissioners’ Report (1995) concluded that the districts of South 
Arcot, undivided North Arcot, parts of Nagal as well as parts of Coimbatore and 
Dharmapuri account for a majority of bonded labourers in agriculture in the State. The 
study has used the Gandhi Peace Foundation estimates (6% of agricultural labourers) 
to estimate that about 475,000 labourers could be bonded. A considerable proportion 
of the bonded labour force are children pledged against a loan at an age of 8 to 9 
years. The Report notes that bondage in agriculture was a result of debt obligations 
arising in a context of decreasing employment opportunities inside and outside 
agriculture. 
 
A survey carried out by the Deccan Development Society in Medak district of Andhra 
Pradesh reported 533 children and 783 adults (both male and female) in bondage in 
only 55 villages. This bondage was reported to be a new phenomenon arising from the 
economic vulnerability of households in a drought prone and ecologically fragile 
region. The labourers, who had taken advances from their landlords, earned wages 
which were 50 to 90% less than the statutory minimum, and toiled from 12 to 14 
hours a day. Children received a pittance for their work (Rao, 1997). A survey 
conducted in Rangareddy district for the ILO (ILO, 2002a), among released bonded 
labourers and other categories of households, found that 3.6% of the households were 
attached farm servants (called Jeetam) of whom 82.5% were indebted to their 
employers. The Jeetam was required to work about 12 hours per day on average, was 
paid less than the minimum wage, and his wife was at the beck and call of the 
employer and was paid half the minimum wage. The loans from the employer carried 
an annual interest of about 30 percent. Among the released bonded labourers, 24% 
were intergenerational farm servants. There are other reports of a fairly high incidence 
                                                 
23  Chamaraj, 2003; see also CEC, 2004, p. 42-45 
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of debt bondage among agricultural labourers in the drought prone districts of 
Telangana and Rayalseema.24  
 
There is some evidence from Andhra Pradesh that male labour outmigration, 
tightening of the labour market and issues of labour control were resulting in a greater 
feminization of bonded labour.25 On the basis of their study in Chittoor district of 
Andhra Pradesh, Corta and Venkateswarlu (1999) find that agrarian capitalists have 
reacted to labour market tightening through tightening control in credit, land rental, 
product (commission buying) and labour (tying) markets.  Under the tied labour 
arrangements, they extend credit and/or garden plots of irrigated land to labourers on 
condition that they provide labour at lower than market wages. During the period 
under study (1970 to 1995), tied labourers increased from 32 to 40 percent. Almost all 
capitalist farmers had one or two labourers, tied either through loans or through 
leasing out of half-acre paddy plots under half-half sharecropping arrangements. In 
the case of loans, labourers were expected to repay their loans through work at low 
pre-determined wages, while also having to perform several unpaid tasks. In the case 
of sharecropping, the labourers had to work at wages which were not pre-determined 
but were lower than market levels. These tied labour arrangements involved more 
women then men which, according to the authors, could be due to employers turning 
to a labour force which could be more easily disciplined. 
 
The bonded labour system continues to persist in parts of Maharashtra. Nine bonded 
labourers were rescued in Thane district by an organisation Shramjeevi Sanghatana, 
in April 1998.26  The organisation has estimated that there are still several thousand 
bonded labourers, mostly from Scheduled Tribes, in that district alone (CEC, 2004,    
p. 53). However, it has been noted that the nature of bondage had changed, with inter-
generational bondage giving way to bondage for limited periods – generally of 1 to 3 
years (ibid.).  
 
A preliminary report to the Supreme Court on bonded labour in Maharashtra gave 
details of the use of migrant bonded labour to harvest sugarcane. It is estimated that 
600,000 bonded labourers (of which over 70 per cent are from Scheduled Tribes) are 
employed by approximately 130 factories from which they receive an advance 
through a labour contractor. The contractors provide loans at exorbitant rates of 
interest which keep the labourers in a perennial state of debt, forcing them to return to 
the sugarcane fields year after year, usually with the same contractor.27 
 
In the absence of detailed micro studies, few generalisations can be made. However, 
from the evidence that is available from a large number of States, it appears that 
                                                 
24  CEC (2004) quotes a report in Newstime of April 6, 2001, regarding the identification and release of 
33 bonded labourers in Mahboobnagar district. Venkateswarlu (2003) reports a very high incidence of 
bonded child labour, mainly girls employed in the cotton fields, particularly in the Telangana and 
Rayalseema regions of Andhra Pradesh (see also CEC, 2004, p. 21). There are also reports of bondage 
of labourers, mainly scheduled caste, in the labour intensive cultivation of sugarcane, cotton, and 
tobacco in the coastal areas, and several thousand bonded labourers employed in lemon plantations in 
Nellore district (ibid., p. 20). 
25   Rao, 1997; Venkateswarlu 2003, Corta and Venkateswarlu 2000. 
26  Indian Express, April 13, 1998. 
27   Reported in the submission of Anti-Slavery International to the 60th (July-August 1997) meeting of 
the Human Rights Committee which monitors the implementation of the United Nations’ International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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agricultural bondage still has strong roots in the traditional and colonial systems of 
exploitation of tribal and low caste labour. But the nature of bondage has been 
undergoing changes with changes in the pattern of production and labour use in 
agriculture, and with higher labour mobility. Large employers, in several parts of the 
country, have tried to adapt and modify systems of bondage to meet their new labour 
requirements. These changes have occurred in dryland agriculture, as well as in 
commercial, capitalist and modern agriculture.  
 
 
5.2  Bonded Labour Systems among Tribals 
 
The Scheduled Tribes belonging to Orissa, Chhatisgarh, Harahan, Madhya Pradesh, 
Southern Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and 
Gujarat, who have suffered a gradual erosion of access to traditional livelihood 
systems, have long been subject to exploitative debt relations leading to loss of land 
and bondage to non-tribals. The National Commission on Rural Labour devoted some 
attention to this issue. 
 
Prasad (2001) has reported that in Dakshin Kannada and Udupi districts in Karnataka, 
the Koraga tribal community of nearly 10,000 people suffers under a system of 
bondage called Ajalu. The Malekudiya tribal community in Belthangady Taluk of 
Dakshin Kannada district has been held in the plantations of the masters called 
Hebbars. The community is denied mobility or the freedom to have their own gardens 
which could give them some economic independence. 
 
In Orissa, a survey by the NGO Action Aid and twenty other organisations in 
Malkangiri district, carved out of Koraput, identified 704 bonded tribal labourers. The 
organisations concluded that there were possibly thousands of tribals from thirteen 
different tribes working as bonded labourers to landlords in the district (Mander, 
2003). The tribals, who had lost most of their land to non-tribals, lived on the brink of 
subsistence and had no option but to take loans from landlords. In exchange, they or 
their children were required to work for the landlords for little more than food and 
some other minor perquisites. Their low wages were adjusted against the interest on 
the loans they had taken. 
 
The NHRC examined a number of complaints regarding the status of Kol tribals in the 
districts of Chitrakoot (Madhya Pradesh), Allahabad and Mirzapur (Uttar Pradesh). 
These have stated that due to dispossession from land, loss of rights to forest produce, 
illegal quarrying and control of mafias over mining, the Kols were living in bondage 
and were denied minimum wages. Many of these complaints were upheld by the 
Commission, which also took the view that the existing system of auction of mining 
rights, which gave a virtual monopoly to dominant economic interests and prevented 
tribals from bidding through their self-help groups (SHGs), was totally unjust and led 
to the exploitation of the tribals (NHRC Annual Report 1999-00). 
 
The NHRC set up an Expert Group in 2000 to examine the problems of the Kol tribals 
and to develop measures for their social and economic upliftment. According to their 
Report (NHRC, 2000), the system of bondage was widespread in the Shankargarh 
silica and sandstone mining region of Allahabad. The silica lease rights for 6 villages 
were placed with one feudal landlord who mined the area both legally and illegally 
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with the help of contractors. Although a large number of bonded labourers had been 
released after the promulgation of the Bonded Labour System Abolition Act, very few 
had received rehabilitation grants. The system of bondage still persisted in the area. In 
some villages, SHGs formed by tribals had been given sandstone mining rights, 
leading to a tripling of their income (Roy, 2000; NHRC, 2000). 
 
A system of slavery was prevalent among many tribes of Arunachal but has 
disappeared from most of them. However, it has recently been reported that the 
system continued among the Bangni and Miji tribes of East Kameng district. The 
Bangnis have slaves from their own community as well as from the Sullong (Puroik) 
tribe (Mishra 2001, Thakur 2003). A comprehensive survey, carried out under the 
orders of the Supreme Court in 1997, identified 3,542 bonded labourers mainly 
belonging to the Sullong tribe (Mishra, ibid.). The Sullong are in a primitive state of 
development compared to other tribes in the district. Although settled dwellers 
practising jhum (shifting) cultivation, they spend considerable time in food gathering. 
Their staple foodstuff is obtained from the wild Sago palm.  The Sullongs are 
customary slaves who are not in debt to their masters, but whose land and homestead 
are owned by the masters. They live in distant villages and remain at the beck and call 
of the masters for whom they also perform domestic service. The masters pay a bride 
price for the marriage of the Sullong boys and this is used to justify the bondage. 
 
As per the direction of the Supreme Court, the State government appointed a High 
Powered Committee. Each of the Sullongs identified became entitled to a release 
certificate and Rs 1,000 as a subsistence allowance. However, because slavery is so 
woven into the cultural fabric of society, and because the Sullong have no land or 
homestead, the Committee felt that traditional rehabilitation schemes were not likely 
to succeed. The Committee therefore proposed alternative methods to the Labour 
Department.28 However, the NHRC received a complaint from the All Puroik Welfare 
Society that the release of bonded Sullongs existed only on paper, and that most of 
them continued to work with their masters. It was also pointed out that several public 




5.3  Brick Kilns 
 
Brick kilns operate in rural areas throughout the country, for six to eight months a 
year. There are varying estimates of the number of workers in the industry. The 
National Commission on Rural Labour estimated that there were about one million 
workers but according to the All India Brick Kiln Manufacturer’s Association, its 
membership extends to 22,000 units with about 3 million workers.  There could be as 
many as 50,000 brick kilns in all, employing about 100 workers each as per the 
muster rolls (Ghosh 2004, Gupta, 2003, Ateeq and John, 2003). The estimated 
number of workers would then conservatively be 5 million (since women and children 
are not included on the muster rolls). In Punjab state alone, there were an estimated 
130,000 workers in about 2,500 brick kilns (Ateeq and John, 2003). According to one 
                                                 
28   Minutes of the District Level Committee, forwarded to the Ministry of Labour by the Labour 
Commissioner, Arunachal Pradesh, on 19th March, 1999. 
29   NHRC Case No. 12/2/1999-2000. 
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study, there could be 3 million workers in kilns around Delhi and in the adjoining 
States alone (Gupta, 2003).  
 
The pattern of labour recruitment in the brick kilns, and the mechanisms of 
deployment, payment of advances and wages bear a striking similarity across the 
country. Recruitment is almost entirely through middlemen (known as Jamadars or 
Sirdars in the brick kilns around Delhi), based on a system of advances. There are 
distinct processes within the brick kilns, giving rise to a segmented workforce 
including moulders, loaders, stackers, firers and removers. The wage payment 
systems are different for different processes and the labour contractors are usually 
paid a commission through an informal deduction from the labourers’ wages (Ghosh 
2004, Gupta 2003). Workers are paid a part of their wages during the employment 
period on a weekly basis, with the remainder being adjusted at the end of the season. 
This binds the worker (and her/his family) to the kiln during the season, whereas the 
carry-over of advances from one season to the next ensures their availability for the 
next season. The work usually entails long working hours and very low payment. In a 
number of cases, a high degree of coercion is used to discipline the workers and to 
curb protests against breach of contract, which are very common. 
 
A recent study of 499 households from 76 brick kiln units in the Gautam Budha 
district of Uttar Pradesh, near Delhi, brings out some of the features of labour 
relations in the brick kiln industry (Ghosh, 2004). The study reported that both 
recruitment of labour and its deployment were based on a system of advances, 
controlled by contractors who were paid on a commission basis deductible from the 
workers’ wages. In a significant proportion of cases, the debts were carried over from 
one season to the next, with the contractors acing as informal guarantors of the loan. 
The workers were mostly migrants from Eastern Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West 
Bengal. Women and children were not placed on the muster rolls. Wages were 
adjusted at the end of the season with the workers receiving a portion of their wages at 
the end of each week or fortnight. Workers exiting to other kilns could have their 
debts transferred to the new employer who redeemed the debt to the first employer. 
Working and living conditions in the brick kilns were very poor and there was a near 
total absence of any regulation, with none of the labour legislation being 
implemented. The brick kilns were heavily guarded and restrictions placed on 
workers’ movements. Wage rates were very low, but nevertheless above the legal 
minimum, which had not been revised for several years. An ILO study of two brick 
kilns around Delhi reaches similar conclusions. The system, according to the author, 
was akin to forced labour (Gupta 2003).30 
 
Ateeq and John (2003) report the findings of another survey of 6 medium sized kilns, 
employing 130-150 workers, in three districts (Ludhiana, Sangrur and Moga) of 
Punjab, carried out in 2000. Most of the workers were from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh 
and 85% belonged to the SC. Landlessness was a major cause of migration. Seventy-
one percent of the workers were in the 15-35 year age group. In many of the 
processes, the entire family worked in the kilns, and there was intense competition 
between owners to secure labour. Workers were recruited from their villages by the 
Jamadar under informal contracts. During the monsoon period when the kilns closed, 
                                                 
30  However, the study is silent on some crucial aspects eg. whether minimum wages are paid, whether 
accounts of payment and deductions are maintained. It does aver that the advances do not carry 
interest. (for a similar account of Haryana kilns, see Rajalakshmi,  (2004) 
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these workers were unemployed and had to borrow from local money-lenders at high 
interest rates. The advances received from the Jamadars helped them repay these 
debts and brought them back to the kilns each year. It was found that about 53 % of 
the workers had accepted peshgi (advances). The brick moulders (pathers) mostly 
belonged to the SC, were landless and were the most vulnerable to debt. The workers 
were not covered by any of the Inter State Migrant Workers (ISMW) Act provisions. 
They were not paid for the initial 15-20 day period when they were required to clean 
the land nor for periods of sickness or for unanticipated work stoppages. 
 
The 1995 survey of bonded labour by the Commissioners of the Supreme Court found 
a similar picture in the Southern State of Tamil Nadu. In Pudukottal district alone, the 
survey estimated that 80% of the 25,000 workers were bonded.31  The persistence of 
bonded labour in this industry in Tamil Nadu is shown by the fact that 47 bonded 
labourers were released from two brick kilns in Kancheepuram district of Tamil Nadu 
in 2003.32 
 
In the last several years, a number of cases of bonded labour in brick kilns have been 
reported from the States of Punjab, Haryana, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, 
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. Most of these labourers are from the 
Scheduled Tribes or Scheduled Castes and are migrants.  
 
The NHRC gives details of a complaint related to unlawful confinement and 
exploitation of 58 SC labourers, 19 of whom were below 18 years of age. They were 
employed as bonded labourers in a kiln in Aligarh district of Uttar Pradesh.  The 
contractor initially offered to pay a wage rate of Rs 130 per thousand bricks to the 
brick moulders and took them to the kiln after paying them an advance. Later, he 
decided to pay them only at the rate of Rs 100, after deducting an unspecified amount 
on account of the advance. When the workers protested, private guards restricted their 
movement and they were beaten and abused.33 
 
In another incident, at a brick kiln in Gautam Budha Nagar in Uttar Pradesh, near 
Delhi, 180 bonded labourers (53 men, 36 women and 91 children) were rescued in 
February 2000.34 The condition of the workers came to light when one of the women 
workers was raped, and her husband and a child were killed in gunfire by the 
employer and his henchmen when they resisted. The workers were prevented from 
leaving through threat and intimidation. The employer retained more than half their 
wages and gave them only a small sum for subsistence. 
 
                                                 
31  The Commissioners’ survey covered brick kilns in only two districts, while the kilns are spread all 
over the state. The workers were usually brought after receiving an advance of Rs 5000 to 10000. The 
initial preparatory work was unpaid. The wages paid were only about 60% of the initially-stated wages, 
the rest being accounted for by interest on the advance. The work was back-breaking and there were no 
fixed hours. If the family did not pay back the advance at the end of the season, the remaining amount 
was accounted for in the name of the family and signatures were taken from them under the condition 
that they would come back next year to clear the debt. 
32  While the first group of 38 workers were able to get rehabilitation grants which were used to set up a 
cooperative brick kiln on a piece of land allotted by the Collector and to buy a lorry to transport the 
bricks, the other nine labourers had still not been able to secure the grant and were running from pillar 
to post. (Kannan, 2003a). 
33  NHRC Case No. 22507/24/1999-00  
34  NHRC Case No. 23327/24/1999-00 
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The Bachban Bachao Andolan activists, together with the district administration, 
rescued 70 workers from 39 families from a brick kiln in Moradabad district in Uttah 
Pradesh. The workers were scheduled castes from Chhatisgarh State who had been 
lured by middlemen through advances and on promises of a good wage and good 
working conditions. The workers were paid Rs 100 per week plus a ration of 8 kg of 
rice for the entire family, and were beaten up and threatened if they raised their voice 
about their wages.35 
 
In Ferozepur district in Punjab, 69 workers were released from a brick kiln on the 
initiative of an NGO, Dalit Dasta Virodhi Andolan, and the district administration. 
The workers were only paid petty sums and no records of their employment, wages or 
advances were kept by the employers who, however, insisted on repayment of debt 
when the labourers wanted to leave.36 
 
Forty-seven labourers were released by the police from a brick kiln in Baghapurana 
sub-division of Moga district in Punjab. All of them stated that they had not been paid 
their salaries for the last four months and were not allowed to leave the kiln. The raid 
was conducted following a writ petition in the Punjab and Haryana High Court by two 
labourers.37 
 
One hundred and three bonded labourers belonging to 21 families were released from 
the brick kilns of Dadri and Bhiwani (Haryana State) in 1997 (Chaman Lal 2003).  
According to one report, bonded labour in the brick kilns of Haryana was mostly 
found in the districts of Sirsa, Karnal, Kurukshetra and Jajjhar, involving SC and 
other low caste migrants from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan.  Unionisation in 
about 60% of the kilns had brought down the incidence of bonded labour in Haryana 
(CEC, 2004, p. 33). 
 
In May 2001, the Himachal Pradesh High Court ordered the release of 35 bonded 
labourers from 18 families from Saharanpur in Uttar Pradesh working in a brick kiln 
in Sundernagar district of Himachal.38 In February 2002, 15 bonded labourers were 
freed from a brick kiln in Jaipur, Rajasthan (NHRC Annual Report, 2002-03). Ninety-
nine men, women and children were rescued by district authorities from a brick kiln 
in Alwar district in January 1999 (CEC 2004, p. 58). 
 
The People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) Bulletin of June 2002 reports the 
release of 46 bonded labourers, aged 7 to 60, all local Musahars from a brick kiln 
owned by a powerful person in Phulpur sub-division of Varanasi district in Eastern 
Uttar Pradesh (People’s Vigilance Committee for Human Rights, 2002a). According 
to another report in 2002, 33 labourers from Malda district in West Bengal were 
compelled to work in a brick kiln in Varanasi district of Uttar Pradesh at wages which 
were much lower than promised. Their womenfolk were allegedly raped by the 
musclemen and contractors of the kiln owner, and the workers were threatened with 
dire consequences if they protested. Thirteen of the workers fled to another brick kiln 
but were assaulted by the musclemen of their former employer. The workers were 
finally released by the administration as a result of the efforts of local people and an 
                                                 
35  SACCS web site 
36  Times of India, March 1, 2003. 
37  SIFY, 11 February, 2004 (http://sify.com). 
38   The Tribune, May 15, 2001, Chandigarh. 
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NGO, the People’s Vigilance Committee for Human Rights, were given release 
certificates and sent back to Malda by the district administration (People’s Vigilance 
Committee for Human Rights, 2002b). 
 
Bonded migrant labourers in brick kilns have been reported in Danapur and 
Kishanganj districts of Bihar (CEC, 2004, p. 27). Migrant workers from Kalahandi, 
Bolangir, Koraput, Gajapati and other districts in Western Orissa migrate through 
middlemen, from whom they take advances, to work in brick kilns in other districts of 
Orissa or in Andhra Pradesh. Their advances are adjusted against a notional wage 
rate, such that when the workers return home (with small sums of cash), they are still 
in debt to the contractors or kiln owners, whom they have to repay the next season 
(Chakravorty, 2004). 
 
In almost all the regions for which evidence has been discussed here, brick kilns rely 
primarily on recruitment of migrant labour through contractors, based on a system of 
advances which matches the cash needs of labourers from the poor regions. It is not 
unusual for the labourers to use the cash advances to settle their debts at home. Once 
labourers are recruited, various devices such as the use of force, recurrent loans, and 
one-time settlement of payments are used to tie the workers to the kilns for the season. 
Wage rates are usually low, given that in processes such as moulding and carrying 
bricks, entire households are involved. The local influence of the brick kiln owners, 
the remoteness and rural location of the kilns and weak regulation lead to the non-
implementation of labour laws. There are nonetheless some State-level variations in 
the situation. Existence of strong trade unions may have led to a decline of bondage in 
a few States. But overall there is inadequate information on the variation between 
States and its causes. 
 
 
5.4  Stone Quarries, Crushers and Mines 
 
The Study Group on Bonded Labour for the National Commission on Rural Labour 
reported a high incidence of bonded labour in stone quarries and crushers, sandstone, 
marble and slate mines in a number of States including Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, 
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu (Ministry of Labour 1991b). 
 
Bondage in stone quarries in the areas around Delhi became a matter of intense 
legislative scrutiny after the early 1980s, when the Bandhua Mukti Morcha filed its 
landmark case in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court appointed two 
Commissioners, Dr. Mahaveer Jain and Dr. Lakshmi Dhar Mishra, to investigate the 
condition of bonded labour in the industry in Haryana and also gave a number of 
directives to eliminate the practice and to rehabilitate the labourers. However, bonded 
labour continues to be reported from the quarries around Delhi. 
 
In 1999, the NHRC received a complaint from the Bandhua Mukti Morcha that 20 
persons (men, women and children) were kept as bonded labourers in a stone quarry 
in Gurgaon, Haryana. Although the district administration admitted that minimum 
wages had not been paid to them, it did not concede that it was a case of bonded 
labour. The labourers had been given some wage arrears and had been dispatched to 
Rajasthan. The Commission’s own enquiry showed that 29 persons including 10 
children were living in the open near Jaipur city in Rajasthan. They belonged to the 
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Banjara nomadic tribe and had gone to Haryana in 1994 to market their produce. 
While they were there, a contractor for a stone quarry offered them attractive wages 
for work in the quarry. After a year they were denied wages and, in lieu of wages, 
arrangements were made with a local merchant to supply them daily rations on credit. 
When they objected and demanded wages, they were kept confined to their dwellings. 
In 1999, they somehow made contact with the NGO. Only after the NHRC pursued 
the matter were the bonded labourers given release certificates by the Haryana 
government.39 
 
The Bachban Bachao Andolan reported rescuing 101 bonded labourers (men, women 
and children) from a quarry in Charki Dadri in Haryana. Some of the bonded 
labourers had been working in the quarry for over three decades.40 
 
The State of Rajasthan is the second-most mineral rich state in the country, earning 
more than $190 million annually from the mining sector. Marble, limestone and 
sandstone are the highest revenue-earning minerals. Employment in mining in 
Rajasthan is second only to agriculture, providing work to more than 3 million 
workers, of whom 95% are from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.  Around 
37% are women and 15% children (Mine Labour Protection Campaign, 2001).  
 
The mines are operated on leases from government and are small-scale, localised 
enterprises worked entirely by manual labour; the mining practices are unscientific 
and primitive.  Illegal mining is rampant, with contractors operating on expired leases, 
leases in the names of other persons (known as the benami system), and mining in 
areas not covered by their leases.  In August 2000, the Mine Labour Protection 
Campaign (MLPC) carried out a random sample survey in the sandstone mining belt 
in the Jodhpur area in which approximately 70,000 workers are employed and which 
contributes approximately US$ 3.3 million to the state economy annually. A number 
of leases have been granted to low caste lease holders but are actually operated by 
dominant persons from the area.  
 
The leases are broken up into small parcels, each mined under the supervision of a 
piece-rated worker who has a group of family-based time-rated labourers working 
under him. A small percentage of labourers come from the villages in the mining area, 
but the vast majority are migrants who retain links with their areas of origin, since the 
mines function for only about eight months in a year. The system of advances is 
widely prevalent, and both categories of workers borrow from the lease operator or 
the supervisor. The daily wage workers are paid a pittance and female labourers are 
paid around half of what the men receive. There is also a significant incidence of child 
labour (Wazir, 2002; CEC 2001a). The Mine Labour Protection Campaign survey 
showed that 97% of sandstone mineworkers in Jodhpur are indebted, a majority of 
them being in bondage. The debts are passed on from one family member to another, 
or from one generation to the next, and can cause the labourer to be ‘sold’ to another 
contractor (Mine Labour Protection Campaign, 2001).  
 
The National Commission on Rural Labour (1991) had identified slate mines and 
stone quarries in Madhya Pradesh as having a high incidence of bonded workers. 
                                                 
39  NHRC Case No. 1938/2/2002-03. 
40   SACCS web site. 
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Recently, a complaint regarding the existence of 400 bonded labourers in the Chola 
mines (quarries) in Gwalior district of Madhya Pradesh was made by Prof. Sheotaj 
Singh of Bandhua Mukti Morcha. The district administration initially denied the 
report but, on the intervention of the NHRC, 44 bonded labourers were released from 
the mines in 2003 and sent to their homes in Guna and Shivpuri districts. The 
employer was prosecuted under the BLSA Act and SC/ST Atrocities Act and a 
rehabilitation package was given to the released labourers. The workers’ testimonies 
stated that they were denied wages; instead, the contractors issued them with paper 
coupons to purchase essential supplies from shops designated by the employers.41 
 
The condition of quarry workers in Karnataka came to light following the release of 
five workers from a quarry in Srirangapattana Taluka of Mandya district, who were 
made to break stones with heavy chains around their legs. Most of the workers in this 
quarry were from other districts of Karnataka or from Andhra Pradesh. They included 
sixteen children who were paid wages of Rs 10 per day. The labourers had taken 
paltry advances of Rs 500 to Rs 2,500 and were paid only about half the designated 
minimum wages. The labourers’ advances carried compound interest rates and there 
was hardly any prospect of repayment. Heavy fines were imposed for any kind of 
absenteeism and workers were subjected to corporal punishment. All the workers 
belonged to the Bhovi community, a low caste community specialising in stone 
breaking, the majority of whom spent their lives in bondage in quarries. The chained 
workers were released through the efforts of the Karnataka State Farmers’ 
Organisation (Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangham or KRRS). It is noteworthy that 
district officials had not reported the existence of any bonded labourers in the district 
and had overlooked the illegal quarrying of this mine (PUCL Bulletin, June 13, 2000; 
Sreedharan and Muniyappa, 2000; Chamaraj, 2000). 
 
The Tamil Nadu Commissioners’ Report (1995) reported large-scale bonded labour in 
quarries, both within and outside the State. The survey reported long-distance 
outmigration from the districts of Salem, Dharmapuri, dry parts of Thiruvannamalai, 
Samuvaryar, North Arcot and so on. Many labourers migrated to Gujarat, Madhya 
Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka to work in quarries, while several thousand 
also out-migrated from these districts to work elsewhere in Tamil Nadu. The survey 
estimated that 750,000 labourers worked in the quarries of Tamil Nadu, about two-
thirds of whom were bonded, including entire families. The Commissioners’ Report 
traces the origin of bondage in the quarries to the introduction of the public auction 
system in the 1970s, and the mechanisation of stone crushing which forced the 
workers to work longer hours for lower wages. In the quarries, the contractor or the 
sub-contractor advances money to the labourers, and supervises the gravel production. 
Apart from the element of debt, the workers are provided accommodation in the 
quarry and have limited mobility. They can only change employers if the new 
employer is prepared to meet their existing debt obligation. Constant watch is kept 
over them so that they cannot mix with other labourers. 
 
Extensive granite, stone and other quarrying sites are found in the districts of Guntur, 
Rangareddy, Warrangal, Vishakhapatnam and Nellore in Andhra Pradesh (CEC, 
2004). A large number of workers, mostly migrants from Orissa, Tamil Nadu, 
Rajasthan or other districts of Andhra Pradesh work in stone and other quarries and 
                                                 
41   NHRC Case No. 1351/12/01-02. 
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mica mines under conditions of bondage. As studies from Orissa and from 
Mahboobnagar district in Andhra Pradesh testify, these workers take advances from 
traders and money lenders in their home villages in order to tide over lean periods or 
to meet financial emergencies.  These are then squared off with advances from labour 
contractors who hire them to work in quarries and mines. There, they are paid a 
fraction of their promised wages, the remainder being adjusted towards their advances 
or retained by the employer till the end of the season. A vicious cycle of debt is 
thereby created, which obliges the workers to return to work in the mines year after 
year (Subrahmanyam, 1985)   
 
Within the mining industry, women’s labour is marginalised, being concentrated in 
small mines where the labour process is dominated by contractors, and bondage and 
exploitation are high. Women are forced to take up physically arduous and 
exploitative work as men lose employment due to mine closure and mechanisation. 
They are often subject to sexual exploitation or turn to prostitution to make ends meet 
(Mines, Minerals and People, 2003). 
 
 
5.5  Power looms and Cotton Handlooms 
 
Labour bondage has been reported in handlooms and power looms in different parts 
of the country, especially from Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh.  
 
CEC (2004, p. 19) has reported on the basis of interviews that there are several 
thousand weavers who are bonded to the master weavers in the districts of Prakasam, 
Guntur, Krishna, East Godavari, West Godavari, Vijaynagram, Srikakulam, Medak, 
Nalgonda, Warrangal and the South Telanagana region districts of Nellore, Chittoor, 
Kurnool, Anantpur and Cudappa of Andhra Pradesh. John (1996) has reported on the 
bonded labour system prevalent in Chirala in Prakasam district of the State. 
 
The Tamil Nadu Commissioners Report (1995) noted that cotton handloom and 
powerloom labourers were spread all over the state. About one-third of the weavers 
were in the fold of the co-operatives. However, whether the master weavers take yarn 
from the merchants or the co-operatives, the work was done by weavers who were 
bonded. The pattaria owners advanced money to the weavers who could not change 
employers unless they repaid the loan. Most of the workers were from the scheduled 
caste community. The weavers’ wages were less than the prevailing wage rate.  The 
report estimated that there were 3 million looms in Tamil Nadu and several thousand 
bonded weavers. On 19 November 1997, acting on the petition of a bonded worker, 
the Madras High Court directed the district authorities of Erode District to secure the 
release of 450 handloom workers. The workers, whose movements were restricted, 
were paid a paltry wage and were required to work 18 to 22 hours a day.42  
 
The powerlooms are concentrated in Periyar, Salem and Coimbatore districts of Tamil 
Nadu. The weavers are bonded to the loom-owner mainly due to their debt. In some 
cases, the weaver’s children also work under bondage. 
 
                                                 
42   Business Line, 20 November, 1997. 
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Neve (1999) has studied labour relations in the town of Kumarpalayam in Tamil 
Nadu. The Vaiiar Gounder community which entered the industry in the 1970s uses a 
system of hefty advances (baki) to secure labour, both male and female. The labour is 
referred to by the labourers themselves as bonded. Although large advances 
sometimes carry an element of implicit interest, by and large, wage rates are not 
influenced by the practice of advances and workers can seek to change employment 
on repayment of the debt. Neve notes two features that make this akin to a bonded 
labour system. First, the advances were typically large, so that labourers could not 
ordinarily repay them. Second, employers used other stratagems, including physical 
coercion, to ensure that labourers are disciplined and remain with them. 
 
The issue of bondage in powerlooms has emerged very starkly in the interim report of 
the Special Rapporteur, Mr K. R. Venugopal, in NHRC case no. 3728/96-97, based on 
the complaint of a worker and her husband against two employers, the former having 
been sexually assaulted by one of them. The Report says that the two employers in 
their statement have confirmed that advances are paid to each and every worker “to 
keep the workers bound to their powerlooms”.  There is also the practice of giving 
workers “loans” as distinct from advances which, the employers claim, are given 
without interest and can be repaid in two-three years. However, in the Rapporteur’s 
view, “these employers had institutionalised a system of bonded labour based on 
advances to the needy workers – a bondage that never ended for 90% of them since 
90% of them had to exchange the bondage to the current employer for the bondage to 
the future employer. This is permanent, institutionalised slavery.”  Employers have 
admitted this in some of the cases. 
 
 
5.6  Bonded Labour in Other Sectors 
 
Construction: Labour in large public works and construction sites is often organised 
through middlemen and contractors, leading to well-entrenched systems of advances 
and resulting in bondage. The case of contract labour from areas around 
Mahboobnagar district in Andhra Pradesh (often called Palamuuru labour) has drawn 
the attention of a number of scholars. Olson and Murthy (2000) surmise that nearly 
150,000 labourers seasonally migrate from this district, of whom nearly 50,000 are 
bonded. In a survey of contract labour households in 1991 and 1994, they find that 
these labourers, who hail from landless or small farm households in an endemically 
drought prone and unirrigated region, increasingly rely on advances and loans from 
maistries (contractors) who procure their labour for construction companies on public 
works sites. The workers work for about 12 hours each day, and are paid a small wage 
which is adjusted against advances and loans at the end of the 8 to 9 month contract 
period. During this time, they are provided food for themselves and their dependents, 
a packet of bidis and hair oil (all adjusted against wages). Women labourers not only 
have to hand over the advances to the men folk, but are also sometimes subject to 
sexual exploitation at the sites. There have been sporadic reports of bonded labour in 
the construction industry in several other places.43 
                                                 
43  In Punjab, 65 labourers were released from a cold storage construction site in Jalandhar district after 
complaints were received that the workers were tortured and female workers had been molested. A 
district administration enquiry found that the workers were promised only Rs 600 per month but had 
not been paid wages for 4 months. The employers paid the wage arrears to the employees and the 
workers were released and sent to their homes. However, the NHRC found that no steps had been taken 
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Plantations: There have been reports of bonded labour in commercial agricultural 
systems such as plantations and floriculture. Some of these (e.g. lemon plantations in 
Andhra and tribal labour in the Karnataka plantations) have been discussed in earlier 
sections of this paper. The Tamil Nadu Commissioners’ Report (1995) found that 
migratory labour in cardamom plantations was often bonded. In some of the other 
plantations (rubber, pepper and nutmeg) the condition of bonded labour, numbering 
several thousand, was found to be acute. The Report also found that in the floriculture 
industry, a large number of children were engaged as bonded labour on payment of 
very low wages. 
 
There are also references to bondage, lack of rights and non-payment of minimum 
wages among tribal labour originating in Central India in the tea plantations in Assam 
(Lahiri 2000). 
 
Gem Cutting: According to the Tamil Nadu Commissioners’ Report (1995), around 
100,000 workers are engaged in this industry in Tiruchi alone.  Of a total of around 
160,000 workers, an estimated 100,000 are thought to be in bonded labour. These 
workers take advances from the producers or the middlemen and are paid 50-60% of 
the market wages. The bonded workers are not allowed to work for other employers. 
 
Rice Mills: More than 1000 families were reported to be working as bonded labourers 
in the rice mills in and around the Red Hills area near Perambur in Tamil Nadu 
(Kannan, 2001). These families were immigrants from other districts of Tamil Nadu, 
having been lured to work in the industry against advances of Rs. 5,000 or more. 
Once the loan is taken, the debt burden increases as the interest accumulates. 
Successive generations of the family fall into the debt trap and remain within their 
cramped quarters in the courtyards of the ‘nerkalams’ (rice drying units). In a number 
of cases, the labour of children is pledged against the debt (Meir, 2001; Kannan 
2001). The rice mills of Dhamtari district of Chhatisgarh mainly employ tribals from 
Bastar district. The labourers are paid a small wage, work for 12 to 13 hours, and are 
kept confined to the premises of the mill (CEC 2004, p. 31). 
 
Bidi Workers: Bondage among bidi workers, who are predominantly women and 
children, has been reported from Andhra and Tamil Nadu. According to the Tamil 
Nadu Commissioners’ Report (1995), there are about 750,000 workers in the bidi 
rolling industry in that State, mainly women and children. The system of bondage is 
widely prevalent in North Arcot district. Children and women are in bondage to the 
bidi agents who advance money to them; in many cases, the entire family is bonded. 
The workers are employed in small decentralised units, which are either their homes 
or small factories, through the agents. Pledging of children against loans is also 
commonplace in North Arcot in this industry. In Andhra Pradesh, women and 
children bidi workers in the districts of Srikakulam, East Godavari, Guntur, Nellore, 
                                                                                                                                            
by the authorities to rehabilitate the released workers and instructions were issued accordingly by the 
Commission (NHRC Case No. 663/19/1999-00 and NHRC Annual Report 2001-02). 
A sixteen year old boy, working as a bonded labourer in a construction company, was rescued by 
district officials in Cuddapah district. A contractor of Mahbubnagar district in Andhra Pradesh had 
brought him after paying Rs 16000 to his parents. No wages had been paid to him for the last six 
months and the contractor had refused to divulge his whereabouts to his parents (The Hindu, May 12, 
2001). 
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Cudappa, Chittoor, Warrangal, Karimnagar, Adilabad and Nizamabad work under 
conditions of bonded labour. They remain indebted to the contractors and are paid less 
than the minimum wage (CEC 2004, p. 23). Bidi workers in the Dhamtari district of 
Chhatisgarh also remain in the grip of contractors, who pay them a small wage after 
arbitrarily making deductions in the name of wastage, commissions etc. (CEC 2004, 
p. 33). 
 
Fish Processing: Warrier (1998), in her study of women workers in the sea-food 
industry, described their employment under captive and bonded conditions in the 
cities of Mumbai, Tuticorin, Calcutta, Veraval, Porbandar and Mangalore, Goa and 
the coastal towns of Orissa and Andhra Pradesh (Warrier 1998; CEC 2004, p. 35). 
Twenty seven bonded Tamil workers were rescued from a fish processing factory in 
Porbandar, Gujarat in 1997.44 CEC (2004) cites a Study Report compiled by the 
Ongole based Samudra Theera Matsya Karmikula Union (Sea Fish Workers Union) 
stating that women migrant workers brought from Tamil Nadu, Kerala and other 
districts in Andhra Pradesh have to work as bonded labourers in the sea-food 
processing industry. They are housed in the factory premises, and are paid a pittance 
after the deduction of the contractor’s commission and charges for their food (CEC 
2004, p. 23). 
 
Silver Works: According to the Tamil Nadu Commissioners’ Report (1995), the 
system of bonded labour in silver works involves both adults and children. Of the 
estimated 10,000 workers, about half are bonded. 
 
Mat weaving: The Tamil Nadu Commissioners’ Report (1995) shows that in 
Vandavasi taluk, there are 20 big and 36 small mat units in which all the labourers are 
bonded. 
 
Salt pan workers:  There are an estimated 100,000 to 300,000 salt pan workers in the 
coastal districts of Gujarat, mostly belonging to the Koli or other low castes and many 
others who are migrants from other states. They are bonded to the contractors to 
whom they sell their produce at an artificially low price (Ganguli, 2001; John, 2001). 
In Maharashtra, Prabhu (2001) reports that hunger during the lean season forces the 
salt pan workers to take loans from the khatedar, against a commitment that the 
labourer will work at half the prevailing wage. 
                                                 
44  Radha Venkatesan, The Indian Express, 27 February, 1997, New Delhi 
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5.7  Bonded Child Labour  
 
There are a number of industries where children’s labour is pledged against loans 
taken by their parents, and children have to work for long hours under intolerable 
conditions. Human Rights Watch (1996), based on a survey of 100 bonded children in 
five states (Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh), has 
identified bonded child labour in a number of occupations including agriculture, brick 
kilns, stone quarries, carpet weaving, bidi rolling, rearing of silk cocoons, production 
of silk sarees, silver jewellery, synthetic gemstones, precious gem cutting, diamond 
cutting, leather products etc. These children are made to work against debt taken by 
their parents or guardians, at low or no wages, from a very young age.  In a review of 
bonded child labour in India, Mehta (2001) has also brought out the extent of the 
problem in a number of sectors including carpet weaving, agriculture, bidis, silk, salt-
making, fireworks and matches, glass, silver works, gemstones, leather and brick-
kilns.  There have been reports of bonded child labour in other industries such as 





The carpet weaving industry in India has had a very high incidence of child labour, 
including a sizeable proportion of migrant child labourers who work under the worst 
possible conditions of bondage. Estimates of the size of the problem vary. Moreover, 
the nature of the industry has changed rapidly since 1996 with a shift towards home-
based production and production in new districts in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, 
Madhya Pradesh, and elsewhere. The old core districts of Bhadohi, Varanasi and 
Mirzapur in Uttah Pradesh still employ a very large number of workers. But the 
industry has now expanded to the districts of Allahabad, Kaushambi, Jaunpur and 
Sonebhadra. In addition, some new carpet-weaving districts in Bihar and Jharkhand 
are Garhwa, Samastipur, Palamau, Madhubani and Saharsa. These districts were areas 
from where migrant child labour was previously sourced for the core carpet weaving 
areas (Sharma 2002). 
 
                                                 
45  Twenty-nine children were rescued from a circus in Kerala by an NGO (Bachban Bachao Andolan) 
in April 2004. The children had been brought from Nepal after their parents were duped by middlemen 
who promised them light household jobs. The circus owners had rejected the pleas of parents to hand 
them back (webindia123.com/news, New Delhi, April 23, 2004). In January 2001, a joint effort by the 
campaign against Child Labour, Peoples Union for Civil Liberties and the district authorities brought 
about the identification and release of 23 bonded child labourers from fishing camps in Shimoga in 
Karnataka (CEC 2004, p. 49). 12 children from Madurai district in Tamil Nadu were rescued from 
Ganjam and Raigada districts of Orissa due to the efforts of an NGO, the SOCO Trust, and the Adi-
Dravidar Welfare Department. These boys were lured away by agents who paid money to their parents 
and made to work in “Murukku” (savoury) shops in Orissa under very difficult conditions. (The Hindu, 
June 24, 2001). Another 27 children from Madurai, who worked under similar conditions in sweetmeat 
shops in Western Uttar Pradesh were rescued by the district administration, once again because of the 
efforts of the same NGO (Kannan 2003b). Seventeen bonded children were released in Delhi on the 
initiative of a NGO. Some of the children had been ‘bought’ in Bihar on payment of Rs 1000 each and 
had been made to work in Mumbai before being brought to Delhi to work in a tailoring establishment. 
The children were made to work in 12 hour shifts and were given only food as wages (Indian-Asian 
News Service, June 5, 2001) 
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Estimates of the incidence of child labour and bondage in the carpet industry vary 
significantly. Juyal (1993) estimated that there were 350,000 child workers in the 
industry, almost two-thirds of all workers, whereas a study by Vijaygopalan estimated 
that child workers were only 8% of the workforce. Sharma (2002) estimated that child 
workers were about 19% of all workers, of which only girls were only 7%. Only 2.2 
percent of the child workers were inter-district or inter-state migrants. Srivastava and 
Raj (2000) found that child labourers constituted 58% of the workforce in the woollen 
carpet industry in Eastern Uttar Pradesh and 30% of them were girls, but the 
percentage of inter-state migrants detected in this study was also small. 
 
The identification and release of bonded child labourers, many from rural areas in 
Bihar and Jharkhand, is still frequently reported in the core carpet areas. Thirteen 
bonded children were released from a carpet factory. The South Asian Coalition 
against Child Servitude (SACCS) complained to NHRC that these children were kept 
in a children’s home instead of being rehabilitated and sent back to their parents. It 
was found that the age of these children had been wrongly certified by the doctor in 
order to protect the loom owner, and they had gone back to work for him. It was only 
after the Commission’s intervention that the release and rehabilitation of the children 
and action against their employer were initiated (NHRC Annual Report, 2001-02). 
 
SACCS also released nine bonded labourers in two raids in the carpet belt of Uttar 
Pradesh. These child labourers had come from poor scheduled caste families in 
Saharsa, Darbhanga and Purnea districts and they or their parents had been duped by 
middlemen. They worked in inhuman conditions, were kept confined to a small, dark 
room, and were paid a pittance.46 
 
In another case, the complainant, a member of the Legislative Assembly in Bihar, 
brought to light the case of two boys who were lured away by a local middleman to 
work in the carpet area of Bhadohi district in Uttar Pradesh. They were both made to 
work as bonded labourers and kept on a starvation diet. One of the boys was beaten so 
badly that he died and his body was disposed of by the loom owner in a gunny bag. 
The matter of compensation had not been sorted out between the two states and the 
full bench of the NHRC had been looking at issues relating to the release and 
rehabilitation of the bonded child labourers of Darbhanga.47 
 
Since 1999, the NHRC has launched special initiatives to tackle the problem of child 
labour in the carpet belt. Steps include a census of all looms and workers in the area, 
and initiatives to rehabilitate the child labourers and their families and to educate the 
children. 
 
Bonded child labour in the carpet industry is also reported elsewhere. Gani and Shah 
(1998) have reported a high incidence of child labourers in the carpet industry of 
Kashmir, many of whom work for their employers in lieu of wages taken by their 
parents. 
                                                 
46  http://www.sholay.com/stories/2000/august/12082000.htm 
47  NHRC case no. 265/2/24/2000-01. 
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Silk reeling and weaving 
 
The Tamil Nadu Commissioners’ Report (1995) found a high incidence of bonded 
adult and child labour in the silk weaving industry in Tamil Nadu. The silk weaving is 
organised through master weavers either in the cooperative sector or outside. The 
master weavers pay advances to weavers, who employ children as helpers. According 
to the Report, the weavers and the children are often bonded. There were an estimated 
30,000 adult and 50,000 child labourers in silk handlooms alone. 
 
Human Rights Watch (1996) has shown bonded children, aged 5 to 12, at work in 
every stage of the silk industry.  These children work up to 12 or more hours a day for 
six and a half to seven days a week, under hazardous conditions, and are often beaten 
by the employers. 
 
Human Rights Watch (2003) has documented large numbers of bonded child workers 
in the silk weaving industries of Karnataka, Kanchipuram district in Tamil Nadu and 
Varanasi district in Uttar Pradesh. Field investigations were carried out in March-
April 2002. The Report estimates that 350,000 children are engaged in silk thread 
making and weaving, working nearly 12 hours a day. Almost all the children were 
from SC/ST or Muslims. Nearly all the children working on a hired basis were 
bonded. Others worked within families, themselves bonded. 
 
The Special Rapporteur to the NHRC, Mr. K. R. Venugopal, has highlighted bonded 
labour in the silk reeling and twisting units in Magadi and Ramanagaram in Karnataka 
state.48 In October 1998, 53 child labourers working in Magadi town were discovered 
during a surprise inspection. Each child or the parent had taken an advance of Rs. 
10,000 to 25,000. The children were made to work for 12 to 14 hours a day and 
received only Rs. 2 to 3 as wages (CEC 2004, p. 48). 
 
Hybrid cotton seed production 
 
A recent survey (Venkateswarlu, 2003) estimates that of about 450,000 girls working 
in hybrid cotton seed farms, about half were bonded. The farms, both local and multi-
national, were concentrated in the Telanagana and Rayalseema regions of Andhra 
Pradesh. The labour force of local or immigrant girl workers, the latter recruited 
through middlemen and employed on a contractual basis (daily, monthly or seasonal), 
were at the beck and call of the employers. The parents were paid an advance in one 
or two instalments, and in some cases given loans with interest. The child labourers 
were required to work long hours and were paid less than prevailing wages. Seventy 
percent of the surveyed children had worked for the same employer in the previous 
year as well. 
 
 
                                                 
48   NHRC Annual Report 1999-00, para 7.12 
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6. Elimination of Bondage: Nature and Scope of 
Interventions 
 
The existence of bonded labour is an affront to basic human dignity. There has been 
some change in the nature and incidence of bonded labour in India as a result of 
various factors, including the impact of social change and social movements, 
economic modernisation and State intervention. While these processes have impacted 
positively on the unfree status of labour in traditional agriculture and in some other 
sectors, the incidence of bonded labour still remains high in some segments of 
unorganised industry, the informal sector and in the relatively modern segments of 
agriculture in some areas.  
 
The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act created a legislative framework for the 
elimination of bonded labour in 1976. But, as both the Supreme Court and the NHRC 
have shown, its implementation by the States has generally remained weak. 
 
The Supreme Court of India has, in a series of judgements, given directions to 
improve the situation and since 1997, under its direction, the National Human Rights 
Commission has been directly involved in monitoring the situation and making 
reports to the Court. In its order of November 11, 1997, passed in the writ petition No. 
3992 of 1985 – PUCL vs State of Tamil Nadu and others, the Supreme Court has 
entrusted to the NHRC the responsibility of monitoring the directions of the Court 
issued from time to time and the implementation of the provisions of the Bonded 
Labour System (Abolition) Act. 
 
The NHRC started monitoring the implementation of the Act in 13 states identified as 
Bonded Labour Prone states. These are: Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, 
Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, 
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. The Commission has appointed two 
Special Rapporteurs, Mr. Chaman Lal and Mr. K. R. Venugopal, who have been 
constantly reviewing the situation in bonded labour prone states and sectors. 
 
The Special Rapporteur in the Northern States has focused on the carpet belt of Uttar 
Pradesh consisting of the districts of Varanasi, Bhadohi, Mirzapur, Jaunpur, 
Sonbhadra and Allahabad, where most of the children employed are migrants from 
the state of Bihar and Jharkhand, working under extremely oppressive conditions 
against some petty advances paid to their parents. Their cases are invariably found to 
be attracting the provisions of the Bonded Labour System Abolition Act (Chaman 
Lal, 2003). The Special Rapporteur has also focused on the problem of Kols in the 
Pathar area of Uttar Pradesh and has held regular review meetings with officials in the 
States of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab and Rajasthan. He 
has also been assisting the Commission in monitoring and reviewing the situation in 
other North Indian States and in ensuring that rehabilitation of bonded labourers, 
especially migrant labourers, takes place on a long-term basis. 
 
In the Southern states, the Special Rapporteur, Mr. K. R. Venugopal, has tried to 
move in a convergent direction by involving and influencing a number of departments 
and by including policy making within the ambit of his work. He has particularly 
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highlighted the issues of bonded quarry workers in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh 
and bonded labour in silk weaving and powerloom industries in Tamil Nadu.  He has 
held regular meetings with officials in the States of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and 
Andhra Pradesh. 
 
The Special Action Group constituted by the NHRC and the institution of the Special 
Rapporteurs has breathed some life into the legislative system and has given support 
to the grass-root NGOs that have been involved in taking up issues of bonded labour. 
Further, in September 2000, the NHRC constituted an Expert Group headed by Mr S. 
R. Sankaran, to make an assessment of the Bonded Labour situation in the country, 
examine the extent and effectiveness of the Bonded Labour Laws and enforcement 
mechanisms and review the functioning of the Centrally Sponsored Scheme for the 
rehabilitation of the released labourers. The Commission has also constituted groups 
to study the problem of bonded labour and child labour in a number of areas, 
including the Kol tribals in Uttar Pradesh and the lock makers of Aligarh. 
 
The identification of bonded labourers continues to present difficulties, and only a 
small number of bonded labourers are actually identified, almost always due to the 
persistent efforts of NGOs (NHRC Annual Report, 2000-01). But among those 
labourers who have been identified and released from bondage, the NHRC finds that 
the rehabilitation of migrant labourers is being totally neglected (Chaman Lal, 2003). 
This is also the view of the Supreme Court of India.49 There can be no doubt that 
effective prevention of bondage amongst vulnerable groups and the rehabilitation of 
freed child and adult bonded labourers are complex issues, requiring sustained action 
from governments, NGOs and the international community.  
 
The Ministry of Labour, Government of India had initiated a Centrally Sponsored 
Scheme under which Rs 4,000 was initially provided for the rehabilitation of each 
bonded labourer, to be equally contributed by the Federal and the State government. 
The amount has since been gradually raised, reaching Rs. 20,000 in May 2000. The 
Central government also provides assistance for surveys, awareness campaigns and 
evaluations. Released bonded labourers are given priority in a number of government 
programmes, such as the distribution of government land, and some States have 
initiated specific programmes for their rehabilitation. But, by and large, the process of 
rehabilitation is frequently delayed, particularly in the case of inter-state bonded 
migrant labourers, and the degree of concerted convergent action required on the part 
of the administration is rarely forthcoming. Prosecution of employers is also weak. 
Since the bonded labourers are very poor and assetless, some can relapse into 
bondage, while others may experience only a very marginal increase in income. Not 
being from an entrepreneurial background, bonded labourers may not be able to earn 
significantly higher incomes or even retain their assets (Mutharayappa, 2002). The 
National Human Rights Commission has been trying to make the states undertake 
rehabilitation of the bonded labourers through convergent action, and through helping 
the bonded labourers form groups or cooperatives which can take up economic 
activity on a sustained and viable basis. As discussed earlier, in Allahabad district, the 
                                                 
49  The Supreme Court judgement in the case of PUCL vs the State of Tamil Nadu (dated May 5, 2004) 
has reviewed the Report of Expert Group on Bonded Labour set up by the NHRC, the observations of 
Amicus Curiae appointed by the Court, and the facts placed by the Union government. The judgement 
notes that identification, release and rehabilitation are the three components of the 1976 legislation and 
that the last has been the most wanting. 
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Commission has supported the granting of mining leases to SHGs of Kol tribals and 
opposed a system of action which excludes these groups from bidding for the mining 
rights. 
 
Since bondage results from severe deprivation arising from lack of assets and 
adequate livelihood opportunities, a key focus of rehabilitation has to be on providing 
assets and means of livelihood to the bonded labourers.  Efforts to do this are more 
likely to succeed if the poor are empowered and collectively organised, and if they 
have the capacity to undertake new activities. Vidyasagar (2001) notes that the 
distribution of land to 44 bonded labourer families in Kodaikanal was successful 
because the labourers were given other infrastructural facilities and were supported in 
their endeavours by an NGO. More importantly, the labourers were used to cultivating 
land in a similar ecological setting. In another case, cited by Vidyasagar, bonded 
labourers who were working in stone quarries in Pudukottai district were released by 
the district administration during the early ‘90s, which also took the initiative in 
rehabilitating them. The workers were organized into co-operative societies which 
were provided with quarrying contracts. The rehabilitation money was pooled 
together to purchase trucks for transportation. Women were given authority within the 
societies and provided proper training to enable them to fulfil their functions. The 
Tamil Nadu Government amended the rules under Section 15 of the Mines and 
Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, to allow the grant of stone 
quarrying leases to the released bonded labourers. This became one of the very 
successful cases of rehabilitation of bonded labour in Tamil Nadu (Murthy 2001). 
 
In the case of the Kol tribals engaged in quarry mining in Shankargarh district of 
Allahabad, a protracted process of empowerment and organisation led to formation of 
groups and to demands for lease rights. Due to a supportive district administration and 
the arduous work of organisations like Sahyog, Sankalp and Mahila Samakhya, the 
kols gained mining rights in a number of villages, were able to overcome the 
opposition of contractors and nearly treble their income over a short period of time, 
drastically reducing bondage in the area.50  However, crucial issues of building 
managerial capacity and cohesiveness among the self-help groups still remain 
important.51 
 
Similarly, eleven Sahariya families freed from bondage in a quarry with the help of 
an NGO, Bandhua Mukti Morcha, were given lease rights to a 70-bigha quarry in 
Shivpuri district of Madhya Pradesh. This has resulted in higher incomes for the 
labourers and high royalties for the government. The district administration started a 
number of convergent schemes to help the released labourers, including the opening 
of a school and the grant of land. When the contractors refused to pick up the stones, 
the families were given a tractor and trolley for transport (Bal, 2003). The district, 
according to BMM, has over 15,000 bonded labourers still working in the stone 
quarries.52 
 
                                                 
50  Roy, 2000. Interview with Justice Amar Saran, a former member of the Vigilance Committee in 
Allahabad, and member of the NHRC Group formed to investigate the condition of the Kols in the 
Pathar area of Uttar Pradesh. 
51  Interview with Sheba Jose, Convenor, Sahyog. 
52  For more details, see the CEC submission to the Planning Commission. (CEC 2001b) 
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There is micro and macro evidence that the organisation and empowerment of the 
poor leads to a decline in bondage. Since bonded labour systems are extremely well 
entrenched in local power structures, with very good linkages with other centres of 
power, significant organisational strength or powerful linkages are needed among 
organisations seeking to eradicate the system. Trade unions do not always have a 
strong presence in the sectors in which bonded labour incidence is high, but in certain 
cases (e.g. brick kiln workers of Punjab) they have helped in reducing the problem. 
Powerful movements of agricultural labourers, as in Bihar, have had a similar impact.  
 
Internationally supported programmes for the elimination of bondage are few, with 
the exception of a number of initiatives for elimination of child labour. Since June 
2000, the ILO has been implementing a project to prevent and eliminate bonded 
labour in South Asia. In India, the project has been operational in Rangareddy district 
of Andhra Pradesh and Tiruvallur district of Tamil Nadu. Starting from the premise 
that lack of access of the poorest households to appropriate financial services is one of 
the causes of bonded labour, the project’s initial aim was to induce microfinance 
institutions to develop products and services targeted at the poorest groups. 
Recognising the social dimensions of bondage, the project aims also at other areas 
including public sensitisation and rights awareness, adult literacy, organising workers, 
income generation and vocational skills development.  The project considers that 
“strategies to eliminate bonded labour need to go beyond the symptoms to address the 
root causes (labour market segmentation, entrenched social discrimination, lack of 
financial services, lack of outreach of social partners in the informal economy). The 
multifaceted and deeply rooted nature of those causes requires an integrated and long-
term strategy.” Project experience also indicates that it may be useful, when designing 
interventions, to draw a distinction between ‘severe’ and ‘mild’ forms of bonded 
labour, the latter being more suited to specific micro-finance based solutions which 
would be inappropriate for the former (ILO, 2004).53 
 
The broad linkages between bonded labour systems, production structures and the 
pattern of development need to be better understood since the roots of bondage are 
related to factors such as production technologies on the one hand, and economic 
vulnerability and structural inequality, on the other. The NCRL Report (1991) had 
highlighted long-term development and land reform measures along with poverty 
alleviation and social security as pathways out of bondage.  
 
Finally, the persistence of bondage is a consequence of weak enforcement of labour 
laws and the laws of the land. India has a plethora of labour legislation regulating the 
conditions of work of contract and migrant labour, prohibiting child labour in 
hazardous industries, and for minimum wages. But these remain in large part 
unimplemented. More significantly, in case after case, there is violation of the 
fundamental human rights of workers, which are enshrined in the Constitution.  A 
concerted effort to ensure implementation of the law, by government in close 
cooperation with employers’ and workers’ organisations and civil society, is called for 
in this respect. 
                                                 
53  The latter appears to refer to ‘bondage’ for a comparatively short and perhaps more clearly defined 
period. But both the analytical/empirical and legal basis for drawing the distinction is unclear in the 
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Extract from the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976 
  
(g) "bonded labour system" means the system of forced, or partly forced, labour under 
which a debtor enters, or has, or is presumed to have, entered, into an agreement with 
the creditor to the effect that - (i) in consideration of an advance obtained by him or 
by any of his lineal ascendants or descendants (whether or not such advance is 
evidenced by the document) and in consideration of the interest, if any, due on such 
advance, or 
(ii) in pursuance of any customary or social obligation, or 
(iii) in pursuance of any obligation devolving on him by succession, or  
(iv) for any economic consideration received by him or by any of his lineal ascendants 
or descendants, or 
(v) by reason of his birth in any particular caste or community, he would- (1) render, 
by himself or through any member of his family, or any person dependent on him, 
labour or service, to the creditor, or for the benefit of the creditor, for a specific period 
or for an unspecified period, either without wages or for nominal wages, or  
(2) forfeit the freedom of employment or other means of livelihood for an specified 
period or for an unspecified period, or  
(3) forfeit the right to move freely throughout the territory of India, or 
(4) forfeit the right to appropriate or sell at market-value any of his property or 
product of his labour or the labour of a member of his family or any person dependent 
on him and includes the system of forced, or partly forced, labour under which a 
surety for a debtor enters, or has, or is presumed to have, entered into an agreement 
with the creditor to the effect that in the event of the failure of the debtor to repay the 
debt, he would render the bonded labour on behalf of the debtor;  
Explanation : For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that any system of 
forced, or partly forced labour under which any workman being contract labour as 
defined in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Contract Labour 
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (37 of 1970), or an inter-State migrant workman 
as defined in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Inter-State Migrant 
Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 (30 of 
1979), is required to render labour or service in circumstances of the nature 
mentioned in sub-clause (1) of this clause or is subjected to all or any of the 
disabilities referred to in sub-clauses (2) to (4), is 'bonded labour system' within the 
meaning of this clause 
(h) "family", in relation to a person, includes the ascendant and descendant of such 
person; 
(i) "nominal wages", in relation to any labour, means a wage which is less than,- (a) 
the minimum wages fixed by the Government, in relation to the same or similar 
labour, under any law for the time being in force; and (b) where no such minimum 
wage has been fixed in relation to any form of labour, the wages that are normally 
paid, for the same or similar labour, to the labourers working in the same locality. 
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